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Journal of Hellenic Studies cxvi (1996) pp 1-32 
HYBRIS, DISHONOUR, AND THINKING BIG 
THE focal point of this article is the detailed study of the concept of hybris recently 
published by N.R.E. Fisher,' and the differences of interpretation which exist between that 
study and other recent work on the concept.2 Though I dispute much of what Fisher has to say 
about hybris, I also defend many of his most important insights, and readily admit that my own 
task has been made immeasurably lighter by his industry and integrity in the presentation of a 
wealth of valuable data. That I take issue with is thesis is no token of disesteem, rather a 
recognition that he has made a strong case for his interpretation and that disagreement with a 
study as well documented as his must rest on detailed discussion of individual passages. 
Fisher sees the essence of hybris in 'the committing of acts of intentional insult, of acts 
which deliberately inflict shame and dishonour on others'.3 MacDowell, on the other hand, 
argues that hybris need not involve a victim, and so need not refer to dishonour; its essence, 
instead, lies in self-indulgent enjoyment of excess energy. Similarly, Dickie argues that hybris 
is essentially a disposition of over-confidence or presumption, as a result of which one fails to 
recognize the limitations and precariousness of one's human condition.4 The dispute between 
Fisher and his opponents thus centres on the importance or otherwise of the subjective 
disposition of the hybristes in the definition of hybris. 
The reference to intention in Fisher's definition indicates that he is aware of a certain 
dispositional aspect, and so his definition is not wholly 'behaviourist'-it does not focus only 
on external behaviour and its effects on others. He also recognizes that in some cases the 
dispositional aspect of hybris may be to he fore,5 and that the  5  t  word hybris can be used as a 
name for the disposition as well as for the act;6 but he consistently locates the essence of the 
concept in the commission of concrete acts, and defines the disposition of hybris with reference 
to the commission of such acts, as merely the t intention, desire, drive, or tendency to commit 
hybristic acts.7 Thus the act of hybris is prior to any dispositional aspect, and the intention 
which is part of the definition is necessarily an intention to perpetrate an act of dishonour on 
a particular victim.8 My position is that this view must be modified; for I do not believe that 
1Hybris: a study in the values of honour and shame in ancient Greece (Warminster 1992; henceforth 'Fisher'); 
for remarks preliminary to what follows, see my review in CR xliv (1994) 76-9. 
2 Especially D.M. MacDowell, G&R xxiii (1976) 14-31, Demosthenes, Against Meidias (Oration 21) (Oxford 
1990) 18-22; A.N. Michelini, HSCP lxxxii (1978) 35-44; M.W. Dickie, in D.E. Gerber (ed.), Greek poetry and 
philosophy: studies ... L. Woodbury (Chico 1984) 83109. J. -109. J. T. Hooker (Arch. f Begriffsgesch. xix [1975] 125-37) 
is misguided in his search for an original, neutral meaning, but he focuses on phenomena which are also important 
in MacDowell's account. In closest agreement with Fisher is E. Cantarella, in Symposium 1979: Actes du IVe 
colloque international de droit grec et hellenistique (Athens 1981) 85-96 = Incontri Linguistici vii (1982) 19-30. See 
also A.F. Garvie in A. Machin, L. Perne (eds.), Sophocle: le texte, les personnages (Aix-en-Provence 1993) 243. 
3 Fisher 148; cf. 1. 
4 This, as Dickie is aware, has much in common with the 'traditional view' in opposition to which Fisher 
defines his own thesis; see Dickie (n. 2) 101-9, esp. 102; cf. Fisher 2-4 and passim. 
5 See 130, 133, 148, 173, 402. 
6 See 493; cf. 125, 242, 281. 
7 See esp. 1: 'Hybris ... most often denotes specific acts or general behaviour directed against others, rather than 
attitudes; it may, though, on occasions ... denote the drive or the desire ... to engage in such behaviour directed 
against others.' Cf. 212-13, 229, 323, 393; also K. Latte, Kleine Schriften (Munich 1968) 13. 
8 Cf. Fisher in P. Cartledge et al. (eds.), Nomos: essays in Athenian law, politics, and society (Cambridge 1990) 
126 and n. 14. 
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DOUGLAS L. CAIRNS 
the act is prior to the disposition in the definition of hybris, nor that hybris must be defined in 
terms of an intention to insult a specific victim. 
II 
Fisher's definition of hybris takes its authority from Aristotle's treatment in the Rhetoric.9 
It is true that Aristotle does define hybris in terms of actions of verbal or physical affront, and 
that his references to the concept elsewhere in the Rhetoric and in other works are consistent 
with his definition. Nevertheless, it becomes clear from a closer examination of the relevant 
passages that Aristotle's definition places more emphasis on the dispositional element than 
Fisher's, and that the latter, despite the meticulousness of his research, has not quite succeeded 
in identifying the place of hybris in Aristotle's ethical theory. 
Aristotle's definition of hybris in the Rhetoric falls within his discussion of the pathos of 
anger, and more specifically of its cause, oligoria, of which hybris is one of the three kinds 
(1378bl3-15). The statement that hybris is a kind of oligoria is backed by a definition of the 
former: 'For hybris is doing and saying things'0 at which the victim incurs aischyne, not in 
order that the agent should obtain anything other than the performance of the act," but in order 
to please himself' (1378b23-5). Hybris, we are then told, requires the initiation of harm, and the 
pleasure of hybris lies in the thought of one's own superiority (b25-30). Fisher is thus right to 
regard Aristotle as supporting him in referring hybris to acts (including speech acts), and it is 
also true that Aristotle lends support to his insistence that hybris is fundamentally a matter of 
causing dishonour (cf. 1378b29-30, 'Dishonour is part of hybris, for the one who dishonours 
slights'). Already, however, one can discern certain differences of emphasis; Fisher has said that 
hybris has more to do with specific acts than with attitudes, yet Aristotle begins by classifying 
hybris as a type of attitude (oligoria), albeit one which is necessarily manifested in word and 
deed. Similarly, Fisher has characterized his own approach as placing more emphasis on 'the 
intention specifically to insult and the effects of dishonour achieved';'2 whereas Aristotle 
regards the intention which is necessary for hybris not primarily as a wish to bring about a 
certain state of affairs or to affect a patient in a particular way, but as the desire to please 
oneself by demonstrating one's own superiority. It seems to me that Aristotle gives rather more 
prominence to the attitude and motivation of the agent than Fisher allows. 
Yet Aristotle does define hybris in terms of its actualization in word and deed, and Fisher 
can argue that his own reference to the intentions of the agent covers the subjective aspects to 
which I have drawn attention. The intention to please oneself and feel superior, after all, is only 
the obverse of the intention to dishonour another, as Aristotle himself makes clear at 
1374bl3-15-not every case of striking is a case of hybris, but only when one strikes for a 
reason, such as dishonouring the other person or pleasing oneself. Aristotle clearly regards the 
intention to dishonour as parallel to the intention to obtain the pleasure of feeling or appearing 
9 Fisher 7-11. 
10 Translating 6 npxTeiv Kicoct tX1tv (A; Ross, Kassel), rather than r6 PXd6tuciv Kct XoiieIV as in some later 
Mss. (and earlier eds.). MacDowell, Meidias (n. 2) 20 argues that this sentence is not an exhaustive definition of 
hybris, on the grounds that bpplt, minus the article, must be the complement and T ipTTEiv icKTX. the subject. But 
the article is omitted with the subject, i6pt;, as often with abstract nouns, esp. the names of virtues and vices, while 
its presence in tr6 p6tT?lv is explained by the need to mark the infinitive as substantival. 
I I follow E.M. Cope (The Rhetoric of Aristotle ii [Cambridge 1877] 17) and Fisher (8) in the interpretation 
of the phrase, ifI tvxa n yfvirat aft(T &xXo, fn 0&r tyveTo; the alternative proposed by W.M.A. Grimaldi, 
Aristotle: Rhetoric ii (New York 1988) ad loc., seems to me very unlikely. 
12 (n. 8)126 n. 14. 
2 
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HYBRIS, DISHONOUR, AND THINKING BIG 
superior,'3 and this seems to bring us back to Fisher's definition. In fact, however, close 
attention to the context of this passage reveals that Aristotle's view of hybris and Fisher's are 
somewhat different and that Fisher has failed to follow up certain leads which show precisely 
where hybris fits in Aristotle's ethical theory. 
Aristotle's remarks on hybris belong in the context of a discussion of the forensic branch of 
oratory, which is concerned with acts involving an individual or a community as victim; thus 
Aristotle discusses the motives, conditions, and circumstances of injustice, and gives a short 
account of what injustice, the subject-matter of forensic oratory, consists in. Any ascription of 
injustice to an agent depends on an assessment of his motivation; a bare description of an 
action, in external terms, is insufficient. Thus some admit that they took but deny that they 
stole, or admit that they struck but deny that they committed hybris, and so on (1373b38- 
1374a6). These are disputes about what it is to be unjust or wicked and the opposite, and 
therefore abouth prohairesis, for wickedness and wrongdoing lie in the prohairesis, and terms 
such as hybris and klope connote prohairesis (1374a6-13). 
Fisher translates prohairesis here as 'intention',14 but prohairesis is a technical term in 
Aristotle's ethical writings which signifies much more than intention.'5 It is important in both 
ethical treatises (and the Magna Moralia) in the discussion of the various states of character 
which are classified as excellences or defects, but is discussed in particular detail in EN iii 2-3 
(cf. EE ii 10-11, MM 17-19) and vi 2.16 From these and other passages we learn that all 
actions which result from prohairesis are voluntary, but not all voluntary actions result from 
prohairesis (thus prohairesis is already distinguished from mere intention),17 and that 
prohairesis follows deliberation qua deliberative desire to perform actions which contribute to 
the ends set by one's rational desire for the good.18 Thus it requires that concept of the end 
of one's conduct which is supplied by one's developed and settled state of character (hexis), be 
13 Fisher (10 n. 17; cf 57 n. 71) is right to claim (against M. Gagarin in G. Bowersock et al. [eds.], Arctouros 
[Berlin and New York 1979] 231-2; MacDowell, Meidias [n. 2] 20) that the pleasure mentioned here is, as at 
1378b26-8, that of demonstrating one's superiority, and so entails asserting one's own claim to honour at others' 
expense. 
14 Fisher 10. 
15 W.D. Ross, Aristotle5 (London 1949) 200 distinguishes a 'technical sense' of prohairesis (relating to means) 
in EN iii 2 and vi 2 from its supposed use elsewhere to mean 'purpose' (relating to ends), but see R. Sorabji in A.O. 
Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1980) 202-4. 
16 For recent discussion of prohairesis, see esp. A. Kenny, Aristotle's theory of the will (London 1979) 69-107; 
D.S. Hutchinson, The virtues of Aristotle (London 1986) 88-107; N. Sherman, The fabric of character (Oxford 1989) 
79-94, 106-16; cf. G E.M. Anscombe in J. Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle ii (London 1977) 61-6; Sorabji 
(n. 15) 201-5; D. Wiggins in Rorty (n. 15) 222-7; D. Charles, Aristotle's philosophy of action (London 1984) 137-42, 
151-5. 
17 EN 1112al4-15, 1135b8-1 1, EE 1223b38-1224a7, 1226b34-6; cf. Anscombe (n. 16) 61, 66, 69-70; T.H. Irwin 
in Rorty (n. 15) 127-33, id., Aristotle's first principles (Oxford 1988) 340-2; Sherman (n. 16) 67. 18 Follows deliberation: EN 1112al5- 1113al4, EE 1226a20-b30,1227a5-18; deliberativedesire: EN 1113al0-1 1, 
1139a22-b5, EE 1226b2-20; chooses Td 7p6<;ts d T?X: EN 1112bl 1- 1113al4, 1113b3-4, EE 1226a7-13, 1226b9-20, 
1227a5-18; telos set by boulesis: EN 1113al5-b3, EE 1226al3-17, EE 1227a28-31, 1227b37-1228a2; cf. EN 
1142b28-33 on euboulia. For detailed discussion of prohairesis, deliberation, practical wisdom, and their relationship 
to means and ends, see L.H.G. Greenwood, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Book 6 (Cambridge 1909) 46-7; D.J. 
Allan in Barnes et al. (n. 16) 72-8; J.M. Cooper, Reason and human good in Aristotle (Cambridge Mass. 1975) ch. 
1 passim; W.F.R. Hardie, Aristotle's ethical theory2 (Oxford 1980) 160-81, 212-39; Sorabji (n. 15) 201-14; Wiggins 
(n. 16) 222-7; Sherman (n. 16) 70-1. Despite passages such as EN 111 b9-10, 1135b8-l 1, EE 1224a4, not every 
action that is with prohairesis need follow actual deliberation: see EN 11 17a 17-22; Cooper 6-10; W.W. Fortenbaugh, 
Aristotle on emotion (London 1975) 70-5; Sorabji (n. 15) 204-5; Charles (n. 16) 187; Irwin, Principles (n. 17) 344; 
Sherman (n. 16) 82. 
3 
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it virtuous or vicious;19 in order, therefore, for a prohairesis to be good, the agent must possess 
excellence of character,20 and, by the same token, excellence of character requires the exercise 
of prohairesis (the choice of the specific moral action for its own sake in the light of one's 
overall conception of the end).21 It is in the prohairesis that we see virtue or vice, and the 
praise and blame which presence or absence of virtue rightly attracts respond not to the act but 
to the prohairesis.22 
Certain aspects of this picture are particularly relevant to the account of hybris in Rhetoric 
i 13 and ii 2. First, the Rhetoric agrees with the Ethics that prohairesis is the mark of virtue or 
vice: 'Wickedness and wrongdoing [gLoX0r ppta Kact tr 6liK?iv] lie in the prohairesis, and such 
terms (e.g. hybris and theft) connote the prohairesis' (1374all-13). Secondly, hybris was 
defined as gratuitous insult, motivated by a desire not to achieve any ulterior purpose, but to 
obtain the intrinsic pleasure of demonstrating one's own superiority through the dishonouring 
of another (1378b23-8; cf. 1374al3-15). Hybris, then, is explicitly said to be a kind of action 
performed for its own sake, one which implies a prohairesis, and if the summary indications 
given in the relevant passages of the Rhetoric presuppose the developed framewor   d k of the 
Ethics, then the prohairesis which hybris connotes is much more than an intention. 
That the reference to prohairesis at Rhetoric 1374a 1-13 does presuppose the technical sense 
of that term is apparent from the context in which it occurs, for the entire discussion of adikia 
in i 10-13 is clearly related to that of justice and injustice in EN v.23 Thus r6 6lwK?iv is 
defined as voluntary injury in contravention of the law (1368b6-7), the criteria of the voluntary 
are summarily rehearsed (b9-10; cf. EN 1135al5-b8), and voluntary action is distinguished from 
action on prohairesis (blO-12; cf. EN 1135b8-11), which is a sign of vice. Injustice in the 
fullest sense exists when the agent acts on prohairesis, and this is a sign of the possession of 
a vicious hexis (1374a9-13; cf. 1374bl3-16); but acts of injustice may also be committed by 
those who do not possess this hexis, for example by those who act in anger (1373b33-8); and 
acts which harm others may be committed unintentionally, though ignorance of some relevant 
particular, or by pure accident (1374b4-10).24 This is clearly a simplified version of EN v's 
distinction between atychemata, hamartemata, adimat, kemata, and 'being an unjust person' 
(1135a5-1136a5). The important point for our purposes is that it is only in the last case that the 
19 Requires hexis: EN 1139a33-5; see Cooper (n. 18) 48 n. 59; D.J. Furley in Barnes et al. (n. 16) 59; 
Anscombe (n. 16) 64-6; Kenny (n. 16) 97-9; T. Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle's theory of moral insight (Oxford 1983) 
166; N.O. Dahl, Practical wisdom, Aristotle, and weakness of the will (Minneapolis 1984) 36; Hutchinson (n. 16) 
88-92, 100-7. Charles (n. 16) 151-5 disputes the idea (see Anscombe [n. 16] 64) that every prohairesis requires a 
state of character and a grasp of the end of human action (cf. Engberg-Pedersen 21 n. 27); but see Irwin, Principles 
(n. 17) 598 n. 22. 
20 Excellence of character makes the prohairesis right: EN 1144a20; cf. 1145a4-5, EE 1227b34-1228a2. 
21 Virtue requires prohairesis: EN 1106a3-4, 1110b31, IIIIb5, 1117a5, 1127b14, 1134al7-23, 1135b25, 
1 139a22-6, 1144a 13-22, 1145a2-6, 1157b30, 1163a22, 1178a34-bl, EE 1227b1-5; vice also requires prohairesis: EN 
1110b31, 1135b25, 1146a32, 1146b22-3, 1148a4-17, 1150al9-21, 1150b29-30, 1151a6-7, 1152a4-6. Not only virtue 
(EN 1105a32,1144al3-20), but also vice involves choosing the action for its own sake in the light of one's view of 
eudaimonia. See, e.g., 1127a26-b17 (with Hutchinson [n. 16] 103-4). 
22 EN llllb6, EE 1228a2-18. 
23 Cope (An introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric [Cambridge 1867] 176, 182-5, etc.) exaggerates the extent to 
which use of important concepts of Aristotelian ethics and politics in Rhet. is to be distinguished from more technical 
applications in the Ethics and Pol., but even he (188-93, esp. 189 and n. 1) recognizes that Rhet. i 10-13 presupposes 
the account of justice in EN v. The Rhet. does avoid detailed discussion of problems appropriate to more specialized 
contexts, but its assumptions in many aspects of politics, ethics, and psychology are those of the treatises devoted 
to those subjects. See (e.g.) Fortenbaugh (n. 18) 16, id. in Barnes et al. (eds.), Articles on Aristotle iv (London 1979) 
133-53 (followed by Fisher 9). 
24 That the treatment of justice and injustice is concluded by a discussion of epieikeia (1374a26-b23; cf. EN 
1137a31-1138a3) is another sign that the framework of the EN is being applied. 
4 
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agent acts with prohairesis; this has the consequence that one can actually commit an unjust act, 
and commit it intentionally, and yet still not be an unjust person-one can steal and yet not be 
a thief, commit adultery and yet not be an adulterer (1134al7-23);25 in order to be a thief or 
an adulterer (etc.) one must possess a settled disposition to choose such vicious acts for their 
own sake, qua acts of injustice.26 Thus if the act of hybris is to connote prohairesis it will 
demand more than an intention to dishonour another, for such an intention is possible even in 
cases where no prohairesis is present. 
That Aristotle's first expression of his view of hybris occurs in the context of a discussion 
of justice and injustice already suggests that he sees hybris as a form of injustice,27 and that 
the hexis from which hybris springs is that which is identified in EN v (1129a31-bl0, 
1130a14-b18, b30-1132b20, and passim) as 'particular injustice' (1 tv 9kipel/KIXa L gpoS 
&dlKCa). This is confirmed when we see that the characteristics of particular injustice match 
those of hybris very closely. First, particular injustice is concerned with pleonexia, with wanting 
more of some external good (1129a32-bll); this greed, however, is not purely material, as it 
covers desire not just for money, but also for time, safety, and other things of that type 
(1130b2-4).28 This kind of injustice can be manifested in the distribution of goods, but also 
in the context of 'involuntary transactions' in which an agent creates an unfair inequality 
between himself and a patient in respect of some good, whether by stealth or by force (EN 
1131al-9). Thus particular injustice can be concerned with honour, requires a specific victim, 
and can be manifested in words or in deeds, by physical assault (aikeia, 1131a8) or by verbal 
insult (propelakismos, 1131a9;29 with all this, cf. Rhet. 1374al3-15, 1378b23-8). Just as the 
hybristes is motivated by desire for a particular kind of pleasure (Rhet., ibid., cf 1380b4-5, also 
EN 1149b21), so particular injustice seeksular isthe pleasurtice thats eks the comespleasure that cfromes from the kerdos (EN 
1130b4);30 particular injustice also requires the initiation of wrongdoing, and is not found in 
25 As in Rhet. 1373b33-8, the sign of 'doing injustice' as opposed to 'being unjust' is action in the grip of a 
pathos, typically anger; cf. 135b20-9. (The remarks at 1134a 17-23 are clearly out of place; Gauthier-Jolif, L'Ethique 
a Nicomacque ii 1 [Louvain 1959] 385-6, 406, and Irwin, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics [Indianapolis 1985] 335, 
would transpose the whole section, 1133b29-1134a23; Irwin's transposition post 1135a5 seems better than 
Gauthier-Jolif s post 1136a9.) 26 For the distinction between 'doing injustice' and 'being unjust', cf. 1134a32-3, 1137a4-9, 17-26. It may seem 
that this is ignored isn the passage of the Rhet. under discussion; the point of 1373b38-1374al8, after all, is not that 
of EN 1134al7-23 (the former distinguishes between [e.g.] theft and justifiable removal, the latter between [e.g.] 
being a thief and committing a theft), and at 1374al 1-12 r6 dcI&Eiv, in apparent contradiction of the EN, is said 
to lie in prohairesis; similarly, 1374b4-10 fails to distinguish between adikemata and 'being unjust', attributing 
adike^mata to pone^ria. Thus Cope (n. 11) i 257-8 argues that the EN's distinction between 'doing injustice' and 'being 
unjust' is not operative in the Rhet.; but, as Grimaldi observes (Aristotle: Rhetoric i [New York 1980] 293-4, 304), 
precisely that distinction is made at 1373b35-6. There may be no real problem here: perhaps t6 6iteiv at 1374al2 
and 30c xcaxa t 1374b8-9 are used in a non-technical sense, of the unjust actions of an unjust character, and we 
might say that the refinement of the schema, introducing non-prohaeretic adikemata as a category distinct from 
possession of a vicious character, though presupposed, is not explicitly activated; but if instead we prefer to see 
inconsistency, it will be an inconsistency within the Rhet. passage itself, not between Rhet. and EN. 
27Cf. the explicit references to hybris as a type of unjust act at Rhet. 1373a34-5, 1374all-12, 1389b7-8, 
1391al8-19; cf. also [Arist.] De Virt. 1251a30-6) and [PI.] Def. 415el2 (Fisher 11). 
28 Aristotle is aware that he is using pleonexia in an extended sense (cf. 1132a7-14, b ll-18), and so it is no 
objection to the interpretation of hybris as a kind of particular injustice/pleonexia that elsewhere hybris and pleonexia 
are distinguished (e.g. Pol. 1302b5-9; Fisher 22-4). 
29 According to Ammonius (De Adfin. Vocab. Diff. 20; cf. Fisher 53 n. 52) hybreis are distinguished from 
aikeiai by the fact that propelakismos is necessary for the former; on propelakismos and hybris, cf. Fisher 44 n. 31, 
48, 93, 107. 
30 Kerdos is to be understood here not as gain per se, but as that gain at another's expense which is 
characteristic of particular injustice; the pleonexia in which particular injustice consists is essentially comparative; 
cf. Irwin, Principles (n. 17) 426, 429 and 624 nn. 4-6. This notion of comparison is, as we shall see, also 
fundamental to hybris. 
5 
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retaliation (1138a20-2; cf. on hybris, Rhet. 1378b23-8 once more, also 1379a30-5, 1402al-5). 
Both hybris and particular injustice, then, involve taking the initiative in exalting oneself at the 
expense of others, for no other motive than the pleasure of the offence itself.3' That the 
characteristics of hybris are those of a form of particular injustice seems to me indisputable.32 
If hybris is a type of conduct which results from the vicious hexis of particular injustice, then 
Fisher has not only failed to identify the place of hybris in Aristotle's scheme, he has also 
underestimated the extent to which Aristotle's remarks on hybris form part of a systematic 
ethical theory, which, while it starts from the opinions of the many (and the wise), not 
infrequently has to revise the significance of popular terms in order to accommodate them.33 
The main upshot of this is that Fisher places too little emphasis on the dispositional aspect of 
the concept. Aristotle would probably have allowed that, just as one can commit an unjust act 
without being an unjust person, so one can commit an act of hybris without possessing the hexis 
necessary for action with prohairesis; and he is as capable as other authors of using 
hybris-words in 'behaviourist' senses (less with reference to the motivation of the agent than 
to the objective infliction of dishonour on a patient);34 but in the paradigm case, in which 
hybris connotes vice and requires prohairesis, it requires a specific sort of motivation rooted 
deeply in a developed and settled state of character, a state of character which, in the sphere of 
honour, leads one to enjoy unfairly pressing one's own claims in the face of the legitimate 
claims of others. This, the disposition which is necessary for hybris, is something rather more 
than a simple intention or tendency to act, and thus Aristotle's definition in terms of prohairesis 
differs markedly from Fisher's in terms of intention; at the same time, Fisher's stress on the 
actual infliction of dishonour and its effects on the patient underestimates Aristotle's emphasis 
on the agent's attitude to his own honour, which is both apparent in the definition at Rhet. 
1378b23-8, and necessary if hybris is to be a form of injustice, of the pleonexia which seeks 
more for oneself at the expense of others. The comparative nature of the concept of 
pleonexiaparticular injustice in EN v isolates what I shall argue to be a fundamental feature of 
hybris-that as a way of going wrong about one's own claim to honour it inevitably involves 
going wrong about the claims to honour of others (and vice versa). 
True, Aristotle does define hybris in terms of acts, but even though hybris is, for him, always 
a particular way of treating another person, it is not the nature of the act or the effect on the 
31 Hybris thus meets the criteria for vicious action in the fullest sense-it springs from a settled disposition to 
choose the vicious course for its own sake, in so far as it is pleasant. This also answers to a typical feature of hybris 
in ordinary usage, in which to say that someone acted 'not out of hybris, but ... [for some further motive]' is to deny 
acting 'just for badness', as a demonstration of one's insolent disregard for law or convention; see (e.g.) Lys. vii 13; 
cf. Thuc. iv 95.8, Xen. Anab. v 5.16, Dem. xxi 181-2; Fisher 49, 98, 103. 
32 This helps explain why Aristotle imagines that hybris must always have a victim-all forms of injustice are 
necessarily iCp6; ftcpov (EN 1129b25- 1130a1 3; cf. 1130b20; 1 130b1 -5), and, as a form of particular injustice, hybris 
must occur in 'involuntary transactions' involving two parties. Aristotle's discussion of 'involuntary transactions', 
moreover, focuses on cases where correction will be forthcoming from a judicial source (1130b33-1131a9, 
1131b25-1132b20); likewise in the Rhet. the reference to hybris in i 13 (1373b38-1374al8) is specifically related 
to the needs of the forensic orator (esp. 1374a7-9). The account of hybris in ii 2 (1378bl3-34) forms part of a 
discussion of the pathe which frequently goes far beyond these needs, but even there hybris is discussed qua form 
of oligoria and cause of anger, and so the context demands concentration on affronts involving an agent and a 
patient; it should thus be no surprise that forms of hybris which would be unlikely to form the basis of a court action 
or at least of a dispute between two parties are not considered in Aristotle's definition. Cf. MacDowell (n. 2) G&R 
28, Meidias 20, against Fisher 9. This is not to say that Aristotle is defining a distinct 'legal' sense of hybris, merely 
that apparently victimless cases do not occur to him, given the contexts in which he expresses his views on hybris. 
33 See (e.g.) his account of nemesis, Rhet. 1386b9-1387b20; cf. n. 35 below. 
34 E.g. hybris of homosexual practices thought objectively to involve the dishonour of the passive partner, 
regardless of the motive of the agent or of the partner's consent; EN 1129b22, 1148b31, Rhet. 1384a1 8-19. Cf. Fisher 
13-14, 109-10; D. Cohen, Law, violence and community in classical Athens (Cambridge 1995) 147-51, 155-6. 
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honour of the patient which makes an act hybristic, but the motive; and that motive is a 
prohairesis, a particular choice of a developed character. Aristotle does not explicitly (unlike 
other authors)35 refer to this state of character as hybris,36 but be does have a name for it, 
since by virtue of the possession of such a state one is called a hybristes. Now, the term 
hybristes is derived from hybris, and thus the latter is prior in definition to the former; but we 
can be sure that to be a hybristes for Aristotle is not just to be liable to commit hybristic acts; 
qua unjust acts manifesting prohairesis, hybristic acts must be defined as those which the 
possessor of a particular hexis would perform. The hexis from which hybris springs is that of 
injustice in its narrower sense. That in it lf allows us to adumbrate the typical characteristics 
of the hybristic agent to a certain extent. But other contexts provide further help in narrowing 
down the precise nature of the disposition to choose from which hybris results. 
Our best evidence comes in a handful of passages in which Aristotle discusses hybris as 
typical of particular character types. The Rhetoric's discussion of characterpity and fear, for example, 
consider not only the dispositions which give rise to these emotions (O; &xaf 1CtuEVOt a)tot 
oopofdfvai , 1382b29), but also those which do not. Both pity and fear require the notion of 
one's own vulnerability to misfortune; by contrast, those who believe that their current good 
fortune renders them invulnerable to reversal are disposed not to pity or to fear, but, being 
hybristai (1383a2), and 'in a hybristic condition (diathesis)' (1385b30-), to hybrizein 
(1385b21). Even if hybrizein here does imply the expression of contempt for the unfortunate 
in word or deed,37 Aristotle can refer to a hybristic disposition from which such concrete 
expressions spring, a disposition which entails a blind over-valuation of oneself caused by the 
experience or the illusion of excessive prosperity. All the stress in these passages is on the 
subjective attitude of the hybristes;38 in these accounts of people who are disposed to manifest 
hybris it is the agent's sense of his own superiority that is emphasized, rather than its expression 
in acts which affect others. Clearly, dishonouring others is the obverse of over-valuing oneself, 
but these passages provide further evidence that the latter side of the coin figures more 
prominently in Aristotle's concept of hybris than the former, and they should be used to 
emphasize the element of the sense of one's own superiority in the definitions of hybris at the 
expense of the mere intention to cause a diminution of honour in others. 
The sketches of the characteristics of the young, the rich, and the powerful in the Rhetoric 
and Politics also consistently attribute the hybris of those groups to their failure to form an 
appropriate conception of their own worth vis-a'-vis that of others. The characterization of the 
young at Rhet. 1389a2-bl2, for example, stresses their naivete, their inexperience of misfortune, 
and their acute attachment to time.39 When hybris enters this picture, it is with specific 
reference to acts of insult or mockery (their acts of injustice tend more towards hybris than to 
petty wrongdoing, and they are witty, since wit is educated hybris, b7-12), but these acts spring 
from a particular type of character, one which lacks the experience which should set limits to 
one's self-confidence and self-assertion. 
Being hybristic and arrogant is likewise one of the 'characters' (ethe, 1390b32) which attend 
wealth, and the acquisition of wealth creates the illusion that one possesses all good things, 
35 As Fisher (493) admits. Cf. above, n. 6. Aristotle's account of hybris thus resembles his discussions of aidos 
in failing to recognize that hybris, like aidos, can be the name of a disposition; see my Aidos (Oxford 1993) 393-431. 36 The only instance I can find in the Aristotelian corpus of hybris used as the name of a character trait is in 
the spurious Oec. (1344a35-bl). 
37 I am not sure that we need follow Fisher (19-20) in thus limiting the reference of the verb; on his treatment 
of transitive and absolute uses of hybrizein, see below, nn. 48, 69. 
38 Cf. D. Armstrong and C.W. Peterson, CQ xxx (1980) 69; Dickie (n. 2) 97-8, 102. 
39 Several of these points emerge again by contrast in the characterization of the old at 1389bl3-1390a28. 
7 
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.197 on Mon, 16 Dec 2013 09:22:47 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DOUGLAS L. CAIRNS 
which is the basis of the disposition of being hybristai and hyperephanoi (1390b34-1391al). As 
a result of this error, the rich have a false idea of their own worth and a misplaced confidence 
in their own good fortune (1391al-14).40 The Politics also recognizes the tendency of the 
excessively fortunate to become hybristai and commit hybris (1295b6-11); again, the specific 
reference of the noun, hybris, is to a type of unjust act (bl0-11), but one which springs from 
a mistaken belief that one's particular good fortune entitles one to a greater share of honour than 
it should. Similarly, at 1334a25-8 we read that war compels men to be just and to sophronein, 
whereas enjoyment of good fortune and leisure in time of peace makes them hybristai. All the 
terms here are dispositional; war fosters a disposition of modesty and self-restraint, prosperity 
and peace one of over-confidence and self-assertion;41 to be sure, these are dispositions to act, 
but still this passage resembles the others cited in making it clear that to possess the disposition 
which is necessary for hybris is to have a particular mistaken view of oneself and one's lot in life. 
In Pol. 1295b8-9 it is the absence of reason which explains the mistaken attitude to good or 
bad fortune. The same point is made at EN 1124a26-b6; the megalopsychos has the right 
attitude to time and the goods for which one receives time; others who enjoy the same external 
advantages, but lack virtue, are wrong in thinking themselves worthy of great things and should 
not be called megalopsychoi. These people instead become supercilious (hyperoptai) and 
hybristai, because without arete it is hard to deal appropriately with good fortune; unable to 
bear their good fortune and thinking themselves superior they despise others and do whatever 
they please. In this they resemble the megalopsychos, but his contempt for others is rational 
where theirs is not. It could not be made clearer that one's attitude to oneself and one's own 
worth is for Aristotle a more important constituent of hybris than one's attitude to others; to be 
a hybristes one's contempt for others must be based on a mistaken conception of one's own worth. 
It cannot be said that Fisher ignores such passages;42 but he uses them simply to establish 
what he sees as the conditions or causes of hybris, which properly consists in intentional acts 
of affront. But Aristotle's definitions of hybris presuppose a reference to a source of motivation 
which provides the crucial criterion for differentiating a hybristic act from an apparently similar 
non-hybristic act; hence these dispositional factors are not mere concomitants or causes, but 
characteristics of the hexis which is necessary for hybris. To be a hybristes is not just to possess 
a drive, tendency, or intention to commit hybristic acts, but to entertain a misguided and inflated 
conception of oneself and one's place in the world. Aristotle's sketches of hybristic 
character-types concentrate much more on the subject's excessive concern for his own honour 
than on his assaults on the honour of others. 
III 
Aristotle's view of hybris thus diverges from Fisher's at precisely the point where Fisher and 
his modern critics also differ, on the importance of the disposition of the hybristic agent. Yet 
Aristotle and Fisher remain close in that they both believe that hybris is essentially a way of 
behaving towards other people. Aristotle may place more emphasis on the dispositional aspect, 
40 The same misapprehension which makes the rich hybristai and hyperephanoi makes the powerful 
hyperephanoteroi at 1391a33-bl; it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the adj. hyperephanos reinforces the 
connotation of hybristes at 1390b33. Cf. Armstrong and Peterson (n. 38) 69. 
41 The frequent opposition between hybris and sophrosyne (see Fisher, Index, s.v.) contrasts two ways of coping 
with one's self-assertive urges, and reinforces my contention that the element of over-valuation of one's own honour 
in hybris is more important than Fisher allows. Fisher (111) argues that sophrosyne is an antonym of hybris only in 
so far as it restrains that desire to wrong others which hybris primarily denotes, but the falsity of this follows from 
that of the view of hybris it employs. 
42 See Fisher 12, 19-25. 
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but he agrees with Fisher in so far as he gives no explicit indication of believing that the word 
hybris may be used as the name of a disposition which need not issue in acts infringing the timeA 
of a particular victim. Our task now is to decide whether this restriction of the reference of 
hybris applies across the board. 
First we shall look at some passages in which it seems to me that the dispositional aspect 
is decisive for the application of the hybris-term; these are passages in which either specific acts 
or victims are not mentioned or else the effects of acts on victims are not constitutive of the 
hybris described. My focus here is partly on the requirement that hybris entails a conscious 
intention to dishonour, partly on Fisher's dictum that 'in almost all cases the victim of hybris 
is patently present in the context; where it can or has been doubted [sic] that there is a victim, 
in all cases it can be plausibly argued that one is supposed by the argument' (148). Both these 
requirements, it seems to me, need to be relaxed. 
Several of the relevant passages come from Fisher's general discussion of the links between 
luxury (tryphe^) and hybris (113-17). At Demosthenes xxxvi 42 the hybris envisaged is that of 
Apollodorus: if the Athenians turn the disputed sums over to him they will see his opponent, 
Phormio, in extreme need, while Apollodorus behaves with hybris and spends money on the 
things he usually spends it on. For Fisher (113), the verb hybrizein here is not merely a 
condemnation of Apollodorus' 'extravagant and dissolute behaviour', but signals that such 
behaviour would constitute an affront against the unjustly defeated Phormio. I agree that the 
contrast between Apollodorus and Phormio is emphasized in the text, and thus ths at Apollodorus' 
reaction to his success at Phormio's expense is an important part of the meaning of hybrizein 
in the passage, but there is little warrant for believin that Apollodorus is  t to be imagined as 
deliberately spending his ill-gotten gains on luxuries and depravities with the specific intention 
of further dishonouring his defeated opponent; rather, those who witness his extravagant 
behaviour are invited to construe it as hybris on the grounds that it manifests a shameless 
self-absorption which others, especially those who have suffered at Apollodorus' hands, will 
find offensive. The affront to Phormio and others is not Apollodorus' intention in enjoying his 
luxurious lifestyle in his usual way; rather, his behaviour constitutes an implicit affront to those 
at whose expense he carouses and those whose claim to honour he ignores. If hybrizein may 
refer to excessive self-assertion which dishonours others simply by failing to take their claims 
into account, then there is no specific intention to commit a particular act of dishonour, and this 
case does not fit Fisher's definition of hybris.43 
Two passages in Euripides' Troades demonstrate that, while hybris (qua luxuriating in a 
misplaced sense of one's own superiority) can be construed as an affront to a particular group 
of other people (because they have more reason than others to resent the agent's self-assertion), 
it can also be seen as an attitude which affronts other people in general. At 993-7 there is no 
hint that the hybris of which Hecuba accuses Helen was intended by the latter to dishonour 
anyone in particular; Fisher's suggestion, that in ob' fAv tKavdc aot Td MevfX?) / gfkaOpa 
xoci; <axt; tya943ppfetv Tp0xxai; (996-7) Hecuba refers to a kind of 'extravagance and 
dominant "queening it" [which] would be felt to involve an assertiveness against a husband, 
characteristic of foreign queens',44 is a rather desperate attempt to maintain his schema-Helen's 
43 [D.] xlviii 55 (Fisher 114; cf. 440-1) is an even clearer example of the same thing. Here again hybrizein is 
a matter of excessive enjoyment of (illegitimately acquired) prosperity and again there is an element of comparison, 
between Olympiodorus' hetaira and the women of the speaker's own household; there is no implication that the 
former does or says anything which is specifically designed to bring disgrace on the latter. Rather, they are imagined 
as 'taking it personally' that she should lay claim to a greater degree of honour than is felt appropriate for a person 
in her position. 
44 Fisher 114. 
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hybris does consist in extravagant 'queening it', but there is no reference to a specific victim. 
Instead, Hecuba represents Helen's behaviour as signifying an excessive claim to honour which 
entails an implicit lack of regard for the honour of anyone in Helen's group or vicinity.45 
The occurrence of hybrizein in Eumaeus' denunciation of Melanthius at Od. xvii 244-6 is 
comparable:46 Eumaeus prays that Odysseus will return and put an end to the aglaiai, the 
'splendour' or 'ostentation', with which the goatherd, behaving with hybris (Oppftcov), now 
conducts himself. Fisher sees Melanthius' deliberate insult in his disobedience towards his 
masters, and possibly also his specific acts of violence and abuse towards his fellow servants 
and their guests, but the reference of the participle is clearly to the goatherd's ostentatious 
behaviour and demeanour;47 this is an insult to anyone who has reason to resent such 
presumption, but the reference of the hybris-word is once again to a misplaced exaltation of the 
agent's own honour which only implicitly constitutes an attack on the honour of others. Those 
who may feel themselves dishonoured by the goatherd's conduct do not figure in the thoughts 
of the agent at all; the dishonour to them consists precisely in his focusing on his own honour 
to the exclusion of theirs.48 
In all these passages49 the relevant hybris-word refers to a particular attitude to one's own 
prosperity or good fortune. The emphasis is on the disposition of the agent, but this is a 
disposition which inevitably has implications for the relationship between the agent and other 
people; this seems to me to answer very well to the emphases of the Aristotelian passages 
considered above, where it was clear that both the disposition of the agent (involving a feeling 
of superiority and a confidence that one is invulnerable to the misfortunes which plague others) 
hybris. Hybris is a concept to which both ones  one's own and others' honour are relevant, are nd this 
not merely in the sense that specific acts of insult are typically intended to increase one's own 
prestige at others' expense. 
IV 
At this point it may seem that Fisher and I are not terribly far apart; with regard to the 
passages just discussed, we agree that the behaviour described as hybris can be construed as an 
insult against someone. But whereas Fisher demands a conscious intention deliberately to insult 
a particular victim, I argue that hybris may be a subjective attitude or disposition which can be 
construed as an implicit affront. My emphasis is on that element of hybris which relates to one's 
45 Equally, at 1019-22 the hybris manifested in Helen's enjoyment of barbarian proskynesis involves no intention 
to insult anyone in particular, but an excessive conceit of her own worth, implicitly insulting to all those who do not 
accept that Helen's honour is superior to their own. It is this lack of a proper appreciation of the interplay between 
her own and others' honour that Hecuba misses in Helen at 1025-8 (Cairns [n. 35] 298). 
46 Fisher 171. 
47 Pompous ostentation (rather than deliberate insult) is the sense of hybris at Athen. 522c (a rejected motive 
for the wearing of Persian dress); cf. hybrismenos of clothing at Xen. Cyr. ii 4.5 and (negatively) of a shield-device 
at E. Pho. 1111-12; also of excessively expensive and ostentatious hospitality at Ael. VH i 31 (on all these, see Fisher 
116-17). In the passages which Fisher (ibid.) cites from Clearchus (frr. 43a, 46, 47, 48 Wehrli), hybris is a 
consequence of luxury, and most of the applications of hybris-words refer to concrete acts of dishonour; but in 43a 
the phrase, KaCi 7n6ppco tpo6yovt?c; 3p?co;, which links the tryphe of the Lydians' gardens and their gross acts of 
hybris against others' womenfolk, must indicate that the former as well as the latter involve hybris. 
48 In this passage, as in the others quoted above (this section), Fisher takes an absolute use of the verb hybrizein 
as equivalent to a transitive. But my interpretation suggests that the distinction made by LSJ s.v. between transitive 
and absolute uses is wholly warranted, even if in some instances it is impossible to be sure whether an unstated 
object is to be assumed. 
49 Cf. Theopompus, FGrH 115 F 213 (Fisher 115). 
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own honour, and I argue that the state of mind which over-values one's own honour is decisive 
for hybris, even though hybris regularly involves an assault on the honour of others, and even 
though over-valuation of one's own honour virtually always constitutes at least a potential 
affront. This may still not seem like much of a difference, and it may look as though Fisher 
could accommodate my criticisms without drastically altering his overall thesis; but the real 
distance between our positions will emerge in this section, when we look at Fisher's arguments 
for excluding the disposition of 'thinking big', pride, or presumption from his definition. Terms 
such as mega phronein are, I shall argue, ways of referring to the subjective, dispositional aspect 
of hybris, and thus, since hybris-words can be used in purely dispositional senses, hybris and 
'thinking big' can amount to the same thing. Fisher repeatedly denies this;50 even when the 
two ideas occur in close proximity wity h reference to the behaviour of the same agent, they 
remain (he maintains) conceptually distinct. 
Many passages in which the relevant locutions occur are too general to provide much help 
in settling the matter; whether we distinguish or associate 'thinking big' and hybris in these 
cases will depend on our interpretation of passages which offer more hope of establishing the 
relationship between the two sets of terms. The most obvious of these is to be found in 
Sophocles' Ajax,5' at the end of the speech in which Menelaus, justifying his prohibition of 
burial, attempts to set Ajax's behaviour in the context of the norms of military and civic 
discipline. He concludes: 'These things go by turns. Previously he was a flagrant hybristes, now 
it is my turn to think big. And I forbid you to bury this corpse, or else you yourself will meet 
an early grave if you bury him' (1087-90). 
According to Fisher, Menelaus' 'assertion that Ajax was a "blazing hybristes", but that he 
now "thinks big" proclaims that committing hybris is the arrogant, violent crime of those who 
possess, or seek, power, and merely "thinking big" is acceptable and justified self-confidence 
in one's capacity to exercise power and achieve a satisfactory revenge over one's defeated 
enemies'. But this falsifies the relationship between the terms; Menelaus' language has become 
precisely antithetical,52 and he says explicitly that tptct oapxockki` trac oc (1087); the things 
which alternate should be parallel, and that Ajax's hybris and Menelaus' 'thinking big' are 
parallel is indicated by the use of the adverb, orb (1088)-it is now Menelaus' turn to play a role 
similar to that played by Ajax before, when he was a hybristes. This must mean that hybristes, 
applied to Ajax, refers not to his commission of specific acts, but to his general demeanour as 
one who, as Menelaus represents it, found military discipline impossible to bear. It is to this 
attitude of self-assertion that Menelaus' 'thinking big' now responds, and so 'being a hybristes' 
and 'thinking big' must, at the least, be two ways of describing a disposition of confidence in 
one's own power. 
One must concede, however, that Menelaus is unlikely to be describing his own attitude 
explicitly as hybristic; thus, while the logic of his remarks demands that 'being a hybristes' must 
involve 'thinking big', it is likely that by terming his own attitude 'thinking big' he means 
to differentiate it from hybris. And Fisher repeatedly points out that the expression 'thinking 
big' differs from hybris in that it may be used of justifiable self-assertion, where hybris is 
50 Fisher 125, 148, 224 n. 122, 238, 244, 374. 
51 See Fisher 315-16, Dickie (n. 2) 106. 
52 See 1084-6: ckX' OT&TO jioi Koct 6o; n Kcdtptov 
Kctd gOK 8owDgFv 5pdrVT?; &V fi6)?ieOa 
O<)1K ftVtVet?iV 0T59; &v XUR6jJiF0xa. 53 As Dickie ([n. 2] 106) argues, and Fisher (316) concedes. 
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generally pejorative.54 But the very wording of Menelaus' observation suggests that there is 
a far closer parallel between himself and Ajax than he means to draw, and it is virtually certain 
that his description of himself as 'thinking big' alerts the audience to the possibility of hybris 
on his own part. Menelaus intends a parallel between unjustified and justified 'thinking big'; 
but the logic of pn7?t napaXVX4 T vaDfT is best preserved if the audience take him at his word, 
and see both forms of 'thinking big' as illegitimate. 
This interpretation is confirmed by the chorus-leader (1091-2): 'Menelaus, do not lay down 
wise maxims and then yourself become a hybristes on the dead.' Fisher maintains that the hybris 
against which Menelaus is now warned is the prohibition of burial and nothing else, and thus 
(as usual) an action bringing dishonour on a specific victim. There is little warrant for this in 
the text; but even if the primary reference of the chorus-leader's words is to non-burial, it 
remains significant that he uses the same word as Menelaus had used of Ajax at 1088, and that 
he uses the dispositional term, hybristes, rather than the verb, hybrizein. There is a clear 
sequence of thought running from the description of Ajax as a hybristes at 1088, through 
Menelaus' avowal of his own megalophrosyne' in the same line, to the chorus-leader's warning 
that Menelaus is becoming hybristic at 1092; 'thinking big' is the feature common to both the 
hybris of Ajax, as identified by Menelaus, and the hybris of Menelaus, as identified by the 
chorus-leader. The sequence of thought in this passage is just too neat and precise to admit the 
a priori distinctions that Fisher maintains. 
This interpretation of Menelaus' remarks and the Coryphaeus' response to them also sits 
better with the dialectic of hybris in the play as a whole, where hybris has been applied to what 
'they' do to 'us', rather than to what 'we' do to 'them'.55 Even if Menelaus does not go so far 
as sanguinely to proclaim himself a hybristes, his remarks none the less encapsulate this process 
of retaliatory hybris.56 The same pattern is exemplified in the ensuing confrontation between 
Teucer and Menelaus, in another passage which reveals the connexion between 'thinking big' 
and hybris (1120-5): 
ME. 6 To6trq; ouc1K?V 0ob cygiKp6v OpovE?v. 
T?V. o0t y?cp pdtvoCaov zT/v TxVrlV cKTGlO6cilrv. 
M?. gT'/ 6v nt K0cog6io?ia;, 6&tof' ?t 6Xc[ot;. 
T?E. K&V i(tX6; 6pKtuatc- 0gt rof ' Xoqtl6tvq). 
Me. i yX6xyad 6oo t6v 0Ougr v oi; 86?v6v Tpt?e. 
TE? . t'v T(i 8UiKa ytp ga' ty 6E:tv T povE?v. 
References to a person's temper, spirit, or cast of mind can in fact refer to that person's acts or 
utterances;57 Menelaus' oi0 c5ltKp6V 4)poveiv (1120) is a comment on the insulting language 
of Teucer's speech; likewise, when he refers to Teucer's &teiv6; O9 o6; (1124), he is 
54 See Fisher 112 n. 193, 316, 323, 374-5 n. 144; for neutral/positive applications of mega phronein, etc., cf. 
Xen. Ages. 11.11; S. Aj. 1125; Hdt. vii 135-6. 55 See Cairns (n. 35) 229-30, 234-8. 
56 Thus R.P. Winnington-Ingram (Sophocles [Cambridge 1980] 62) may not be absolutely right to say that 
Menelaus regards hybris as a reciprocal process, if Menelaus is not actually confessing to hybris; but Menelaus' 
remarks do reveal the reciprocity of hybris once we see through his implication that his own thinking big is justified. 
He therefore does, as M.W. Blundell points out (Helping friends and harming enemies [Cambridge 1989] 91), 
manifest a form of hybris which answers that which he blamed in Ajax. 
57 Fisher 377 recognizes this phenomenon in another connexion, but draws no conclusions for his view of the 
relation between 'thinking big' and hybris. 
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commenting on a disposition currently being manifested in speech. The same is true of Teucer's 
defence of his own 'big thoughts' at 1125; Menelaus has identified a formidable spirit of 
self-confidence behind Teucer's language; Teucer then justifies the spirit and the insulting 
language/behaviour with the claim that such are permissible when right is on one's side. 
'Thinking big' in 1125, like thymos in 1124 and 'thinking no small thought' at 1120, refers to 
a demeanour manifested in behaviour, and there is no great difference between saying 'This 
fellow thinks big' and 'This fellow is insulting me': the reference to the disposition is a comment 
on the behaviour. This being so, we can understand the logic of Teucer's defence of his own 
'thinking big'; Menelaus' references to Teucer's spirit and to his 'thoughts' accuse him of 
insolence; Teucer realizes that, in effect, he is being accused of hybris, and so defends himself. 
As all the dispositional terms in this short passage are used to refer to actual behaviour, there 
cannot be as sharp a distinction as Fisher maintains between hybris, the act, and 'thinking big', 
the state of mind. We have seen that a disposition of excessive self-assertion can be construed 
as an effective insult; now it appears that an actual insult can be described in terms of a 
disposition of excessive self-assertion. As hybris can refer to a disposition which can be described 
as 'thinking big', so 'thinking big' can refer to behaviour which might otherwise be called hybris. 
That 'thinking big' and hybris can be identical in reference is also demonstrated by three 
passages of Herodotus vii involving the response of Artabanus to Xerxes' proposed invasion of 
Greece. Xerxes outlines his intentions and his motives in vii 8, and it is clear that the pursuit 
of honour is high among his priorities-he does not wish to be left behind in honour vis-a-vis 
his ancestors, and sees the expedition a s a means of obtaining kudos and winnig back time lost 
as a result of the burning of Sardis and the failure of the previous expedition (vii 8ac.2-y.l); this 
concern for honour, too, is presented in extravagant terms-Xerxes intends to yoke the 
Hellespont (P. 1), and cherishes an image of the Persian empire, after the conquest of Greece, 
encompassing all the ands on the sun shines, equalling 'Zeus' heaven' in extent (Y.1-2). 
So Xerxes is motivated by honour, believes that he possesses a status sufficient to consider 
subduing the elements, and dreams of making his dominion co-extensive with the sovereignty 
of Zeus. Xerxes is also a typical hybristes in believing that his good fortune and that of his 
nation can only continue-god is guiding Persian destiny for the best, and the Persians 
themselves have merely to follow (ac. 1). 
Artabanus sees the dangers in his nephew's plan; he points out that confidence does not 
always precede success, as in the case of Darius' expedition against the Scythians (vii 10oc), and 
gives good grounds for caution in undertaking any enterprise against the Greeks, making 
particular reference to the (apparently pragmatic) dangers of bridging great waterways (cc-6). 
Having stressed the importance of euboulia (106), he offers a general, theological warning against 
over-confidence: 'the god' blasts those creatures which stand out, and does not allow them to 
'show off' (phantazesthai), but is not irritated by the insignificant; the same applies to houses and 
trees, for the god is wont to cut back all things that stand out. Thus a great army can be 
destroyed by a small, because the god allows no one but himself to think big (10e).58 This last 
argument clearly constitutes a response which is very closely focused on Xerxes' proposals, on 
their dangerous over-confidence which threatens to encroach even upon the time of the gods. 
Artabanus' second evaluation of Xerxes' plan comes at vii 16a, after Xerxes has relented 
from his previous fury at his uncle's opposition, but has been warned by a dream-figure against 
calling off the expedition. Xerxes now wishes Artabanus to sit on his throne and sleep in his 
Artabanus' argument shifts from the notion of divine resentment of all forms of prominence to particular 
resentment of human presumption; the latter is his main point, the former merely an illustration, and the function 
of the warning as a whole is to provide another perspective on the unexpected failure of great armies when they cross 
significant natural frontiers to take on apparently inferior opponents. 
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bed, in order that the same dream may appear to him and he may judge that it is sent by the 
gods, and although Artabanus is reluctant to accept this invitation, he feels himself under 
compulsion. He prefaces his acceptance, however, with a rehearsal of his previous opposition 
to a proposal which 'increased hybris' and involved 'always seeking to have something more 
than what is present'. Even when convinced by the dream-figure that the expedition must go 
ahead, Artabanus reiterates his earlier position, referring (with examples) to the failure of the 
strong to overcome the weak, stressing Xerxes' youth, and contrasting the dangers of 'desiring 
many things' with the virtues of 'keeping quiet' (vii 18.2-3). 
This third comment on the merits of the expedition has elements in common with each of 
the previous; it returns to the central point of the first, that great forces have often been 
overcome by weaker, and with the second it shares an awareness of the dangers of seeking 
more. Hybris is associated with 'desiring many things' in the second passage, while in the third 
'desiring many things' is associated with disastrous attempts by greater forces to subdue weaker; 
this brings b s us full circle back to the first passage, where one reason for the failure of such 
attempts is 'thinking big'. All three passages concern attempts to increase power and prestige 
beyond a vague limit of what is 'enough'; hybris is one way of describing the drive to do this, 
'thinking big' is another, and the connexions between the three passages suggest that there is 
not much to choose between them.59 
Another reason for assuming that hybris and 'thinking big' are virtually interchangeable here 
is the presumption that Artabanus' characterization of the proposal to invade Greece should refer 
to identifiable characteristics of Xerxes' original speech. We saw that that speech was strong 
on self-assertion, manifesting a desire to restore and enhance the monarch's prestige; there were 
also hints that this concern for individual royal time was somewhat in excess of the norm, 
envisaging a degree of success which no mortal had hitherto attained. This is readily construed 
as 'thinking big'; but qua extravagant exaltation of one's own claim to honour, stemming from 
youth, existing good fortune, inexperience of failure, and blind faith in continued successfailure, nd success, it also 
patently deserves the title of hybris. In this case it is not merely other mortals who are imagined 
as affronted, but the gods themselves; Artabanus' statement that 'the god does not allow anyone 
other than himself to think big' is a recognition that Xerxes' excessive pursuit of honour 
constitutes an implicit assault on those who possess the most time of all; that the god is the 
party affected in this case does not alter the fact that we have here what is, on my account, a 
perfectly standard case of hybris involving the pursuit of greater honour for oneself in a way 
that threatens the honour of others. 
Fisher's interpretation,60 on the other hand, demands that we dissociate Artabanus' first and 
second evaluations from what Xerxes actually said; on his account, the 'thinking big' of the first 
speech does not refer to a specific offence on Xerxes' part, but is rather an aspect of Persian 
59 See Dickie (n. 2) 104-6. Of particular importance are Artabanus' references to the expeditions against the 
Massagetae, the Ethiopians, and the Scythians; all three, qua attempts to extend power beyond natural limits, have 
a symbolic function both in themselves and in the presentation of Xerxes' expedition; thus, although Artabanus 
advances sound pragmatic reasons against the crossing of important natural frontiers and the attempt by greater 
powers to subdue smaller, his reference to these campaigns is not simply intended to stress the material dangers of 
expansionism (pace Fisher 372), and this constitutes another link between the three passages, esp. between the 
warning against 'thinking big' and divine phthonos in the first and the reference to the three previous campaigns in 
the third. See J. Gould, Herodotus (London 1989) 100-9, and cf. F. Hartog, The mirror of Herodotus (Berkeley 1988) 
331 and (on the Scythian campaign as a prefiguration of Xerxes' invasion) 34-40; on the 'river motif' cf. H. R. 
Immerwahr, Form and thought in Herodotus (Cleveland 1966) 75, 84, 91-2, 130, 132, 166, 183 n. 103, 293, 316; 
Fisher 352-8, 377, 383. 
60 Fisher 367-74, 384. 
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power which attracts (non-moral) divine jealousy;61 whereas the hybris which Artabanus 
identifies in his second speech is not Xerxes' own, and has little to do with his acute concern 
for his own honour, but rather refers to a political characteristic of the Persian nation, its 
tendency towards imperialist expansionism, bringing 'dishonour' on the autonomous peoples 
who are its victims. This explanation fails, first because there is no warrant for distinguishing 
Persian hybris as an abstract national characteristic from the hybris of those who formulate and 
carry out Persian policy, and secondly because the relevant passages have much more to say 
about the dangers of the growth of pride and prosperity in the Persians themselves than about 
the effects of their actions on others. Fisher treats as discrete and heterogeneous passages which 
are more plausibly seen as contributing to one consistent presentation of the metaphysical aspect 
of Xerxes' invasion, in which the elements of human pride, hybris, and divine phthonos 
combine. The divine hand is clearly at work in the dreams which appear to both Xerxes and 
Artabanus (vii 12-19), the attempts of previous potentates to cross natural boundaries provide 
thematic and symbolic parallels for Xerxes' enterprise (n. 59 above), and an oracle promises 
divine retribution for the Persians' hybris (viii 77);62 the judgement of Themistocles (viii 
109.3) draws all these threads together-the gods and heroes caused Xerxes' defeat at Salamis, 
because they grudged (Of6vtruav) one man rule over Asia and Europe, impious and atasthalos 
as he was. Thus divine phthonos is explicitly associated with the expansionism, sacrilege, and 
impiety which even Fisher concedes are hybristic, and referred specifically to Xerxes' desire to 
rule Europe and Asia in vii 8;63 Themistocles' verdict is the fulfilment of the warning uttered 
by Artabanus in vii 10e, which clearly forms part of a presentation of the whole expedition in 
terms of human hybris as infringement of the prerogatives of the gods.64 
Fisher's treatment of two passages from Euripides' Hippolytus indicates the lengths to which 
he has to go to preserve his absolute distinction between hybris and 'thinking big'. At 443-6 
the Nurse argues that 'The Cyprian is not a thing to be borne if she flows in full spate; the one 
who yields she attends with gentleness, but whomever she finds excessive and thinking big, she 
takes and treats with incredible hybris'. 'Thinking big', then, is resisting the power of the 
goddess, the sort of t t hat provokes her to anger to such a degree that she retaliates by 
subjecting her victim to degrading and dishonouring treatment. Compare 473-6: 'Please, my dear 
child, give up your perverse thoughts, stop behaving with hybris-for this is nothing but hybris, 
wishing to be superior to the gods-and endure in your passion.' Both passages comment on the 
same sort of conduct; the one sees resistance to the goddess as 'thinking big', the other as 
hybris, and both designations identify that attitude which magnifies the honour of oneself and 
diminishes that of others. Fisher, however, sees the matter entirely differently; mega phronein 
is a mere condition or concomitant of hybris,65 while the hybris which is actually identified 
61 The interplay between hybris. 'thinking big', and phthonos is discussed below. In the present context Fisher 
(374) may be right to say that the description of the divine reaction as phthonos soft-pedals the offensiveness of 
Xerxes' or the Persians' 'big thoughts' (whereas the description hybris calls attention to a moral offence), but it 
remains clear that 'the god' regards such presumption as an affront. Fisher (ibid.) states that the suffering of great 
armies, which, through divine phthonos, fall victim to small, is 'undeserved'; but this is not the implication of 
ftvaftco; Cowtrv, which contrasts the potential of the greater force for victory with the actual outcome of defeat; 
defeat was unworthy of them because it was incommensurate with their strength in numbers, abilities (etc.). (See 
A.W.H. Adkins, CQ xvi [1966] 90-4, and M. Heath, The poetics of Greek tragedy [London 1987] 82.) 
62 Discussed by Fisher 375-6, and distinguished by him from other evaluations in terms of 'thinking big' and 
divine phthonos. N.b., however, the oracle's conviction that the gods will punish Persian koros, a term which 
emphasizes the extravagant growth of Persian confidence. 
63 Fisher 380 does not make the connexion. 
64 Cf. in general H. Lloyd-Jones, The justice of Zeus2 (Berkeley 1983) 60-9. 
65 Fisher 414. 
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is explained away as 'a cunning sophistry', a 'persuasive definition'. There is no persuasive 
definition; the gods participate in a hierarchy of honour in which the time they possess is 
quantitatively but not qualitatively different from that of mortals; to think big to the extent of 
considering oneself equal or superior to a god is hopelessly to inflate one's own time' and 
provocatively to ignore the time^ of the god; thus the conditions of hybris are satisfied. The 
sophistry of the Nurse's argument lies not in any redefinition of hybris, but in the equation of 
resistance to (illicit) sexual passion with a challenge to the honour of the goddess of sexual 
love; this might well be considered an illegitimate dialectical move, but the move from 
'challenging the honour of the gods' to hybris is perfectly justified in terms of Greek usage; it 
is consonant even with Fisher's restricted definition of the term. There is a degree of confusion 
in Fisher's argument here, but behind that lies a desire to create as much distance as possible 
between hybris and 'thinking big'; it will not work. 
The same is true of the discussion of hybris and mega phronein in connexion with 
Aphrodite's account of her grievance against Hippolytus, rendered in the prologue. Fisher 
recognizes that Aphrodite complains in general of an insult to her honour, and that she is now 
set on revenge precisely because she wishes to establish that mortals may not so lightly seek 
to deny her her due; he also points out that the goddess' complaint against Hippolytus' verbal 
insults (13) is justified by Hippolytus' attitude towards her in his dialogue with the Servant 
(102, 106, 113).66 Yet according to Fisher, the insult constituted by Hippolytus' attitude is a 
mild one, one at which Aphrodite 'should not' take offence, and which Fisher himself 'would 
prefer not' to label hybristic. This is not the place for a discussion of the seriousness of 
Hippolytus' offence; but the point is that he surely does give offence.67 Whether Fisher would 
or would not choose to label Hippolytus' behaviour hybristic is neither here nor there, for what 
we are dealing with is the goddess' evaluation of the he situation. Of course some people (or gods) 
are more sensitive to perceived affronts than others; some see an insult where no normal person 
would; thus what one person considers hybris might not be so regarded by another; but if an 
individual sincerely regards another's behaviour as manifesting unwarranted self-assertion at 
his/her expense, then that individual is linguistically and culturally justified in describing it as 
hybris. Others may disagree with Aphrodite's perception of hybris in Hippolytus, but there can 
be little doubt that it is hybris of which she accuses him. The expression she uses, however, is 
not hybris, but mega phronein (6); yet it is clear that Hippolytus' 'large thoughts' have a 
target-o6lXXc ' 6(oot 'povofne tv eit fort; g(y8a, says Aphrodite, and she explains her 
statement with reference to the gods' paramount concern to receive time from mortals (7-8). Not 
only can 'thinking big' in practice constice constitute an affront, but the phrase itself can be used 
actually to refer to the commission of an affront. Thus there is no possibility of a neat 
separation of 'thinking big' from hybris.68 
66 Fisher 416-17. 
67 Fisher (417) sees the Servant's attempt to avert Aphrodite's anger (114-20) as evidence that Hippolytus' 
lifestyle, demeanour, and specific remarks do not constitute a major insult; but the Servant only feels driven to make 
this attempt because of his concern at the danger of what Hippolytus has said, and his wish that Aphrodite show 
forgiveness is a reminder that gods take such attacks on their honour extremely seriously. 
68 Cf. A. Pers. 800-31 (Fisher 259-61); hybris (808, 820) certainly refers to concrete acts, including failure to 
recognize the honour of the gods (807-12), but it is also associated with 'godless thoughts' (808), 'thinking excessively 
for a mortal' (820), 'despising one's present fortune' (825), 'excessively boastful thoughts' (827-8), and 'harming the 
gods with over-boastful boldness' (831); if the disastrous results of hybris (821-2) give a reason for avoiding excessive, 
unmortal thoughts (820; n.b. ,yp. 821), then 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' must be a form of hybris; see Dickie 
(n. 2) 107. Fisher answers Dickie by making the dangerous concession that 'having excessive thoughts' may be 'an 
element' in hybris here, but maintains that not all such self-assertion is hybristic. The (fallacious) argument that, 
because hybris and 'thinking big' are not identical in definition, they are never identical in reference is also used 
(308-9) to distinguish hybrizein and hybris in S. Ant. 480 and 482 from mega phronein in 479. 
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The previous paragraphs have discussed those passages which contain references to both 
hybris and 'thinking big' etc. and which offer some hope of establishing the relationship 
between the two. They have shown that subjective dispositions of self-assertion, describable as 
'thinking big', can be considered as genuine cases of hybris and that even where hybris also 
encompasses acts which have an impact on the honour of others, mega phronein etc. can refer 
to its dispositional aspect. The overlap of hybris and mega phronein corroborates what was said 
above about the importance of the subjective, dispositional side of hybris, and it should be 
obvious that the kind of inflated opinion of one's own worth conveyed by expressions such as 
mega phronein or phronema is a regular feature of hybris even where these expressions do not 
occur. The passages in which mega phronein etc. constitute part of hybris only make explicit 
what is latent in the other passages considered above.69 
V 
The question of offences against the gods and their phthonos has already been touched upon; 
we now need to decide to what extent hybris may be an offence which arouses the anger of the 
gods, and whether divine phthonos can be a reaction to human hybris. Fisher's exhaustive study 
has performed an enormous service by refuting the misconception that there is something 
fundamentally 'religious' about the concept of hybris, whether that misconception be what he 
assails as the 'traditional view' (hybris as a form of human presumption which meets with 
divine nemesis, especially in tragedy)70 or the more interesting, but equally unsubstantiated 
thesis of Gernet (on the essentially religious quality of time).71 Nevertheless, even under 
Fisher's conception of hybris it is clear that the victim of insulting or dishonouring behaviour 
can be a god as well as a mortal; and so he discusses a number of passages in which hybris- 
words are used explicitly to denote attacks on divine time72 In the previous section, too, we 
saw that the 'thinking big' which can often be construed as hybris could impinge upon divine 
as well as human honour.73 A species of 'thinking big' is 'thinking more than mortal thoughts', 
and we saw in connexion with Darius' speech in Persae (n. 68) that such thoughts could be part 
and parcel of hybris. Another example might be the description of Capaneus in the Septem; 
Capaneus' boast o5 KOCx' 5vOpontov pov?i (425), and he is openly contemptuous of Zeus and 
the gods (427-31); Eteocles sees him as a thinker of 'vain thoughts' and comments on his 
dishonouring of the gods through his boasts (438-43). That this behaviour can be described as 
hybris is clear, and Fisher concedes that, 'When verbal kompoi and mataia phronemata take 
these forms and are expressly directed against the honours and powers of the gods, they clearly 
constitute hybris;' but 'that is not to say that all boasting and foolish thoughts can be so 
Cf, e.g., the Aristotelian passages in sect. II in which hybris is associated with wealth, power, and misplaced 
confidence in continued good fortune; cf. E. Supp. 463-4, 726-30, 741-4 (Fisher 420-1; the first and third of these 
passages contain absolute uses of hybrizein, and again Fisher's translation, 'commit hybris', begs the question by 
assuming specific acts against particular victims). Cf also the hybris of Cyrus' sacred white horse (Hdt. i 89; Fisher 
353-4; MacDowell, G&R [n. 2] 15), which is not disobedience towards its master (Fisher's standard explanation of 
the hybris of domestic animals, 119-20), but the creature's misplaced confidence that it is able to ford a river which 
in fact is only crossable by ship (vriDxutcpryrov i 89.1). 
70 See Fisher 2-3, 32, 142-8, and cf. 484-5, 491-2 on the (untypically) religious aspect of hybris in PI. Laws. 
(But see below, VI.) 
71 Fisher 5, 56, 62. 
72 Fisher 144 (Ar. Nub. 1506-9), 146 (Lys.fr. 73 Thalheim), 147 (Lys. ii 9), 412-14 (E. Hipp. 473-6), 415 (Or. 
1641-2), 445-6 (Ba. 516-17, 553-5, 1297, 1347). Hybris may also concern the gods in the sense that they are felt to 
punish hybris among mortals; but here again hybris is no more specifically religious in nature than any other form of 
human injustice; see Fisher, Index, s.v. 'gods, concern at hybris/injustice, etc.', and cf. MacDowell G&R (n. 2) 22. 73 Most explicitly in the case of E. Hipp. 6-8, 13, and Hdt. vii lOE. 
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described'.74 That this is not an admission that 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' is always 
hybris is made clear by his discussion of Clytemnestra's speech at Ag. 958-74; 'such 
over-confident boasting of one's good-fortune [sic] and its permanence should ... be classified 
rather as a strong form of "saying things too great for mortals" (etc.), that, because they can be 
offensive to other humans and to the gods, may conceivably be considered as (mildly) 
hybristic'.75 Fisher's position seems to be that 'thinking (and expressing) more than mortal 
thoughts' and hybris are conceptually distinct, but that a strong form of the former may (as a 
matter of contingency) constitute a mild form of the latter, even in the absence of the desire 
deliberately to inflict dishonour on a specific victim. This attempt to have one's cake and eat 
it will not work;76 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' is unlike 'thinking big' in that the 
latter can, apparently, be justified; the former, however, entails the notion of excess and always 
involves reprehensible self-assertion in the face of legitimate claims to time; thus it always 
constitutes a standard case of hybris in its unattenuated sense.77 
There is in many passages a strong connexion between 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' 
and divine phthonos. Fisher accepts the existence of a notion of divine phthonos which focuses 
on recognized moral offences on the part of human beings;78 he is less willing, however, to 
accept that such moralized phthonos may have human hybris as its object. Yet Herodotus' 
account of Xerxes' invasion of Greece, as we have seen, draws clear links between hybris, 
human presumption, dishonouring the gods, and divine phthonos. Themistocles' retrospective 
explanation of the success of Greek resistance (viii 109.3) contains traces of all these notions. 
Greek victory, he says, was not achieved by merely mortal means, but the gods and heroes 
resented (begrudged, were envious-tof6vrjav) that one man, an impious and wanton 
(atasthalos) man, a man who committed gross acts of sacrilege, who actually lashed and bound 
the sea, should rule Asia and Europe. The phthonos identified here focuses not only on the 
presumption first made apparent in Xerxes' initial proposal to add Europe to add Europe to his rule (vii 8p-y), 
the kind of presumption which Artabanus could describe both as a form of 'thinking big' liable 
to attract divine phthonos (7. 10E) and as hybris (vii 16a.2), but also on the specific acts of 
impiety and atasthalia which even Fisher agrees may be regarded as hybris.79 This phthonos 
clearly bears a considerable moral charge, and responds both to hybristic deeds and to hybristic 
attitudes. We should expect that wherever divine phthonos bears a similar reference to more 
than mortal thoughts which directly impugn the time of the gods it should also be regarded as 
responding to hybris.80 
74 Fisher 253. 
75 Fisher 290. 
76 Cf. his discussion of S. Aj. 756-77 (342-8). 
77 On hybris and 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' cf. Dickie (n. 2) 85 against Fisher 445. Dickie does, 
however, import notions of 'mortal limits' or 'the human condition' rather too freely into the discussion. 
78 See Fisher 360, 362, 374. 
9 
See Fisher 377-8, on Herodotus' account of the bridging of the Hellespont, where he recognizes that the use 
of atasthala (vii 35.2) identifies conduct which might also be described as hybris. 
80 Cf. Hdt. i 34.1; Croesus' presumption, Herodotus conjectures, attracted divine nemesis. Fisher (357-60, esp. 
358 n. 1) is right to argue that the mere occurrence of the term nemesis is no proof that Croesus is to be regarded 
as guilty of hybris, for the supposed correlation between human hybris and divine nemesis which is such a feature 
of the 'traditional view' is poorly attested. Instead, Fisher agrees with Gould (n. 59) 79 that nemesis bears its 
Homeric sense of 'indignation'; but when he claims that this nemesis is merely 'the "indignation" of an "envious" 
deity' (358) he ignores the fact that Homeric nemesis always focuses on some perceived offence (see Caims [n. 35] 
51-4; cf. J. M. Redfield, Nature and culture in the Iliad [Chicago 1975] 117); if Fisher and Gould are right about 
the sense of nemesis (and I am sure they are), then they must locate the focus of that nemesis in a failure to accord 
honour where honour is due; Croesus' prosperity has led him to place himself on a level higher than other men and 
to presume to know and control what no mortal can know or control. The signs of hybris are all there. N.b., then, 
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This is clearly the case in the 'carpet-scene' of the Agamemnon.81 Time is central to the 
scene; Clytemnestra's invitation is an attempt to persuade Agamemnon to lay claim to a greater 
share of honour than a mortal should possess (922, 925), and her decisive argument, after which 
Agamemnon ceases to resist, appeals explicitly to his desire to be honoured (939). Agamemnon 
realizes, too, that Clytemnestra is urging him to exalt his own honour to the extent of 
dishonouring the gods, and is fully aware of the dangers of phthonos as a divine response (921, 
946-7); unlike Herodotus' Croesus, he is determined to avoid counting himself happy before he 
is dead (927-30);82 and he remains uneasy even as he prepares to tread the crimson path, his 
aidos in 948-9 a sign that he realizes he is pushing his own claim to time' too far and failing to 
pay honour where honour is due.83 The phthonos of the gods which is so prominent in this 
context, then, does not focus only on human prosperity or success; rather, Agamemnon is 
persuaded to act in a way which demonstrates an illegitimate response to success, a response 
of over-valuation of one's own time^ clearly classifiable as the hybris which proceeds from 
prosperity. Fisher's insistence that Agamemnon's actions and motives, while representing 'more 
than mortal thoughts', constitute at most only a 'mild' form of hybris,84 becomes explicable 
when we realize that for him it is only the gravity of the act itself which really matters. But the 
importance of the scene lies in what it tells us about Agamemnon's motivation and his sense 
of his own honour vis-a-vis that of others; the phthonos envisaged focuses on Agamemnon's 
excessive self-assertion, and this is hybristic precisely because its 'victims' are those who enjoy 
the greatest time of all. The scene suggests not only that 'thinking more than mortal thoughts' 
is necessarily a form of hybris but also that phthonos and hybris can be correlatives. 
It remains to be seen, however, whether they are necessary correlatives, or only contingently 
so, where phthonos has become a just response to human offences rather than mere jealousy. 
We need, therefore, to explore the concept of phthonos in greater detail. As a human emotion, 
phthonos bears no essential reference to hybris. Human phthonos focuses on another's 
possession of goods which one would like for oneself; it presupposes no moral offence, but is 
a malicious reaction to others' success or good fortune which is frequently said to demonstrate 
the viciousness not of its target, but of its patient.85 Yet this phthonos does operate within the 
same milieu as hybris, in that it enjoys a fundamental relationship with the notion of honour. 
Phthonos can be directed at the possession of any good,86 but in practice the relationship 
between phthonos and competition for honour is intimate, first because it is typical of the 
phthoneros to resent not only the other's success, but also the enhanced reputation and status 
which success brings; phthonos, as a feeling that others' success somehow diminishes one's own 
standing, thus belongs with the competitive impulse of philotimia.8 Secondly, as a reaction 
to the possession of some admired good or quality, phthonos is the negative obverse of that 
that the statement at i 34.1 is referred in context to Solon's warning that the divine is 09ovep6v and tcapac6Sc; (i 32.1). Fisher is right to assimilate nemesis and phthonos in this case (contrast Gould [n. 59] 80), but wrong to deny 
their focus on an offence on Croesus' part. 
81 For a recent discussion of the scene, with bibl., see G. Crane, CP lxxxviii (1993) 117-36. 
82 See Crane (n. 81) 130-1. 
83 Cf. Cairns (n. 35) 194-8, 210-11 n. 129. 
84 Fisher 287-9, with repeated doubts as to whether 'the walking on tapestries should be called hybristic at all' 
(289). 
85 See (e.g.) Arist. Rhet. 1388a35-8; cf. PI. Laws 731a-b; Isoc. ix 6, xv 259; Plut. Quaest. Conv. 681e; P. 
Walcot, Envy and the Greeks (Warminster 1978) 72-5; cf P. Bulman, Phthonos in Pindar (Berkeley 1992) passim. 
86 See Arist. Rhet. 1386b 18-20, 1387b21-1388a28. 
87 See Arist. Rhet. 1387b31-1388a23 on phthonos and philotimia, esp. the remarks on the grounds of phthonos 
(1387b34-1388a5) and on its typical targets (1388a5-23). Cf. Walcot (n. 85) 16-20, 34, 62, 97-8; H. Lloyd-Jones, 
Greek comedy, Hellenistic literature, Greek religion, and miscellanea (Oxford 1990) 255-7. 
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positive acclaim which is conveyed by terms such as time, kleos, etc. Hence the commonplace 
that others' phthonos, though possibly harmful and certainly to be deprecated, is at least a sign 
of one's own achievement, that phthonos is better than pity.88 
There is no question of a total separation of meaning between human and divine phthonos, 
and the conception of divine phthonos, I take it, will have grown out of the deeply rooted belief 
that the gods are givers of both good and evil on an apparently indiscriminate basis, and that 
they are particularly stinting (phthoneroi) in their granting of good fortune or in allowing it to 
continue.89 The idea that the gods somehow resent mortals' success has its roots in Homer,90 
but is expressed in terms of phthonos (etc.) only in later authors such as Pindar, Aeschylus, , and 
Herodotus. It is generally accepted that in these authors moral factors enter into the notion of 
divine phthonos to a greater or lesser degree, but there is real disagreement as to where the line 
should be drawn between ('unmoralized') conceptions which focus on success alone and those 
('moralized') which focus on human transgression.91 Fisher is firmly on the side of those who 
see real persistence of the unmoralized view (especially in Herodotus), and he draws an absolute 
distinction between the gods' punishment of hybris and their non-moral resentment of human 
prosperity; there may be a degree of overlap between the fields in which hybris and phthonos 
are operative (because divine phthonos may focus on human offences), but where the 
'unmoralized' form of phthonos is in play, no overlap can exist; the gods' resentment of human 
prosperity in itself cannot be regarded as outrage at human hybris.92 
This is debatable, for there are certain differences between human and divine phthonos which 
make it difficult to consider a conception of the latter which totally excludes the possibility of 
a relationship between divine phthonos and human hybris. In achieving the kind of success 
which annoys a god, a human being has transgressed a boundary in a way that the target of 
human phthonos has not; for, though it may be virtually impossible to know for certain where 
the limit lies, there certainly exists an unbridgeable gap in status between men and gods. Since 
this is true, and since it is well known that the gods resent all incursions into their sphere, it 
behoves any prosperous mortal to avoid antagonizing the gods by the appearance of rivalry; 
accordingly, if such a person's success does antagonize the gods, he has failed to be cautious, 
to exhibit the proper attitude of mind. Thus in divine resentment of human prosperity there will 
always be an element which focuses on the attitude of the human victim, either on his failure 
88 See Clytemnestra at A. Ag. 939; better to be envied than pitied, see Pi. Pyth. 1. 85, Hdt. iii 52, Thales 17 
DK, Epicharmus 285 Kaibel/B34 DK. The Pindar passage is perversely interpreted by Bulman (n. 85) 5, 21. For the 
standard interpretation, see A.W.H. Adkins, Moral values and political behaviour in ancient Greece (London 1972) 
77; see further G.M. Kirkwood in Gerber (n. 2) 169-83. 
89 See W.C. Greene, Moira (Cambridge Mass. 1944) 20, 28, 36-7, 39-42, 47-8, etc. The verb phthonein does 
not occur in the context of divine responses to human affairs in Homer, but its sense of 'begrudging', 'refusing to 
grant' (see Walcot [n. 85] 26; Bulman [n. 85] 15-17) is shared by agasthai, which is used of the gods' grudging 
attitude towards mortal happiness (I1. xvii 70-1, Od. iv 181-2, v 118-20, viii 565-6, xiii 173-4, xxiii 209-12; cf. 
Greene 19-20; Lloyd-Jones [n. 64] 57; Walcot [n. 85] 26). 
90 See II. v 440-2, vii 446-53, Od. iv 78-81, xii 287-9, with Greene (n. 89) 20; Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 4, 56; 
Walcot (n. 85) 26. 
91 Broadly, commentators divide into those who find that all or most instances of divine phthonos found in 
Pindar, Aeschylus, and Herodotus are, in some sense, 'moral', and those who believe that even in (one or other, or 
some passages of) these authors traces of the unmoralized version remain. For the first view see E. Fraenkel, 
Aeschylus: Agamemnon ii (Oxford 1950) 349-50; Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 56-70, (n. 87) 255-6; Bulman (n. 85) 1, 31-4, 
88 n. 66; for the second, see Greene (n. 89) 6-7, 48, 74-5, 84-8, 103, 106, 113 n. 54; Adkins (n. 88) 78-82; Walcot 
(n. 85) 22-51; R.P. Winnington-Ingram, Studies in Aeschylus (Cambridge 1983) 1-13. 
92 See esp. Fisher 363: 'the chorus of the Agamemnon (750 ff.) analysed in Chapter Seven [pp. 275-7] is ... 
strong evidence that explanations in terms of divine jealousy at human prosperity and those in terms of divine anger 
at human crime are felt to be incompatible contraries'. Cf. Garvie (n. 2) 243-4, 249, 252. For Fisher's distinction 
between 'moralized', 'unmoralized', and 'ambiguous' forms of divine phthonos, cf 360, 362. 
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to manifest the correct attitude (to recognize the gulf between human and divine prosperity, as 
well as the role of the gods in human achievement), or on his active adoption of the wrong 
attitude (deliberate rejection of mortal limits, through an inflated conception of himself as master 
of his destiny and guarantor of his prosperity). The target of human phthonos, by contrast, is 
not necessarily deluded as to his real status and worth. Thus divine phthonos, even when 
focusing on the prosperity of its target, must always be a form of resentment in which the divine 
agent feels justified, in that the target has failed (by commission or omission) to recognize the 
boundary which separates his time from that of the gods.93 
This can be demonstrated by passages in which the concept of divine phthonos is felt to be 
at its most 'unmoralized'. In Aeschylus' Persae, the divine phthonos which Xerxes, according 
to the Messenger, did not understand (362) is not explicitly referred either to great prosperity 
alone or to some more specific offence; it certainly belongs with the Messenger's ascription of 
the defeat at Salamis to the influence of an alastr or kakos daimn (354), as with similar 
Persian pronouncements on the unpredictability of (unnamed) daimones, but there is also stress 
in the context on Xerxes' confidence (352, 372-3), which the Queen later explains in terms of 
the human tendency blindly to believe that present good fortune will continue forever (601-2). 
The unpredictability of fortune or of the gods who grant and withhold good fortune has been 
a theme since the beginning of thee ni play (see 93-100, 157-8, 161-4); it was with the help of 
'some god' that Darius amassed his great prosperity, and the correct attitude in anyone who 
would retain such prosperity is caution. The Messenger's reference to phthonos belongs with 
these hints of a mistaken attitude to prosperity and to the decisive role played by the gods in 
all human affairs which are later broadened into an account of the Persians' deluded pride, 
impiety, and hybris by the authoritative pronouncements of Darius' ghost.94 
Similarly, in Herodotus' presentation of the warnings delivered by Solon to Croesus and 
Amasis to Polycrates (i 32.1, iii 40.2)95 the emphasis is more on the need to manifest the 
proper attitude in success than on the notion that success in itself provokes the gods to envy; 
Croesus, Solon implies, should be more circumspect and less confident of his own happiness, 
given that prosperity is in the lap of the gods, with their tendency to disrupt human affairs. This 
point is just as clear in the case of Amasis' advice to Polycrates, which urges him, in view of 
the divine propensity to phthonos, to acknowledge the role of the gods in all human prosperity 
and to manifest a proper sense of perspective with regard to his wealth by jettisoning something 
he values highly. That the gods are not simply concerned with material wealth emerges in 
sinister fashion from the fact that even this propitiatory offering proves unsuccessful-the offence 
cannot be undone by material propitiation (and Polycrates' display of caution and humility 
comes too late to save him).96 In all these cases there exists at least a minimal idea of offence, 
and the conditions for describing the behaviour and motivations of the humans involved as 
hybris are, at least from the divine point of view, satisfied. 
Neither in Persae nor in Herodotus, moreover, do apparently non-moral conceptions of 
divine phthonos constitute the last word on the subject. In Persae, the Persians' complaints 
93Cf. (broadly) Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 4, 56-8, 67-70, (n. 87) 255-6; N. Yamagata, Homeric morality (Leiden 
1994) 97-8 makes a similar point. 
94 Winnington-Ingram (n. 91) and Fisher 261-2 agree that the interpretation offered by the Ghost is authoritative, 
but contrast this moral explanation of Persian failure with the supposedly non-moral interpretation of the other 
characters; M. Gagarin (Aeschylean drama [Berkeley 1976] 49-50) denies that the Ghost's interpretation has any 
special authority. Others (Fraenkel [n. 91] ii 349; Lloyd-Jones [n. 64] 69) regard the Messenger's reference to 
phthonos as itself a moral explanation. 
95 See Fisher 357-60, 362-3 (resp.). 
96 In the case of the phthonos against which Artabanus warns Xerxes the element of moral offence is, as we 
have seen, even clearer (confirmed at viii 109.3). 
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against the evil deities who have struck them down at the height of their fortunes are 
partisan,97 and belong with a perspective which seeks to minimize the notion of Persian 
offence; the true perspective is offered by the ghost of Darius, but it is one which the Athenian 
audience will already have formed for themselves as they set the remarks of the Persian 
characters in the context of all that is said about Persian prosperity and presumption. Likewise 
in Herodotus, most of the references to divine phthonos come in speeches,9 and in the cases 
of Solon, Amasis, and Artabanus their purpose is precisely to warn without giving offence; all 
three try to promote the correct attitude to one's own prosperity and the prerogatives of the 
gods, and so remind their interlocutors of the dangers of offending jealous and resentful deities, 
as a way of stressing the dangers without actually accusing them of hybris. The suggestion of 
hybris, however, is there; Solon, Amasis, and Artabanus are not denying that divine phthonos 
is a response to a perceived human offence; they are rather suggesting that the gods have a 
tendency to perceive offence where none is intended. The implication that divine resentment is 
sometimes excessive and unjustified allows the warning to be conveyed without explicit 
accusation of hybris. But the gods themselves believe their phthonos to be justified, and the 
author or the reader can always endorse this interpretation.99 Thus Solon, diplomatically, 
speaks of the instability of good fortune and reminds his host of the grudging meddlesomeness 
of the divine; but the reader will have noted the dangerous moral blindness involved in Croesus' 
conviction that his prosperity is paramount and permanent, and the notion that forthcoming 
himself (not, as Lloyd-Jones points out,.00 because he was) the most fortunate of men.0' 
An evaluation in terms of phthonos, then, can never entirely rule out an interpretation of the 
same state of affairs in terms of human hybris. In all behaviour which attracts divine phthonos 
will be found the same elements of the transgression of limits, of the offender's excessive 
pursuit of honour and status, nd of the corresponding insult to the time of the gods. 
VI 
The final area in which I wish to test Fisher's view of hybris concerns the role of 
exuberance, energy, and high spirits. This will lead us into an examination of certain instances 
of hybris in Plato which Fisher regards as anomalous, but which I believe can be accommodated 
in an account which lays proper emphasis on the dispositional aspect. We come now to the 
central point of disagreement between Fisher and MacDowell. For MacDowell,102 the notion 
of excess energy or exuberance stands very close to the heart of the concept, whereas for Fisher 
97 See 345-7, 353-4, 472-3, 513-16, 724-5, 909-11, 920-1, 942-3, 1005-7; cf Winnington-Ingram (n. 91) 13-14, 
Fisher 261. 
98 Cf. Immerwahr (n. 59) 313, who argues that the one occurrence of the notion in narrative (iv 205) proves 
that 'the great advisers do indeed propound a Herodotean idea'. The phthonos of iv 205 is moral in scope, and 
Immerwahr's statement will, I think, be true only if we construe divine phthonos in moral terms. 
99 Cf. Lloyd-Jones (n. 87) 255-6. 
100 See Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 63; cf 68. 
101 That divine phthonos is by definition justified seems to be the view favoured by Aeschylus in Pers. and Ag., 
and to be implied in Herodotus. Similarly Pindar's references to divinephthonos (01. 13.24-8, Pyth. 8.71-2, 10.20-1, 
Isth. 7.39-42) belong with warnings such as 'Seek not to become Zeus' (Isth. 5.14, cf. 01. 5.24) and his stress on 
the objective limits dividing man and god (Nem. 6.1-4). See Lloyd-Jones (n. 64) 69; Bulman (n. 85) 31. Kirkwood 
(n. 88) imagines that the use of divine phthonos as a 'rhetorical formula of praise' (174-6) entails the absence of 'the 
Herodotean religious meaning' (182; cf. 176, 179). The two are not incompatible; even if the former is primary, it 
implies the latter. 
102 And for Hooker (n. 2). 
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the essence of hybris, even when associated with such ideas, is always to be found in a more 
immediate and specific reference to dishonour. Crucial to MacDowell's case are those passages 
in which hybris is attributed to animals and plants, which he maintains cannot simply be 
dismissed as metaphorical, but must contribute to an overall definition.103 
On the basic question of the status of the hybris of animals and plants I agree with Fisher 
that such manifestations must be regarded as metaphorical and therefore as parasitic on standard 
applications of the term. None the less, there must be a ground for the metaphorical extension, 
and we are entitled to look for the point of comparison in something that vehicle and tenor may 
be thought to have in common, the identification of which may prove enormously helpful in 
establishing the flavour or character of a concept.'04 For Fisher, the point of comparison in 
the case of domestic animals and plants lies in a sense that they are 'disobedient', dishonouring 
human beings by 'refusing' to behave as required;'05 in wild animals and natural forces such 
as the winds and the sea, on the other hand, the point of comparison is the violence and 
aggression which the elements share with hybristic humans.106 According to Xenophon, Cyr. 
vii 5.62-3, for example, horses which are hybristai cease to bite and to hybrizein once castrated; 
similarly, bulls cease to mega phronein and apeithein, and dogs to desert their masters. The 
notion of disobedience, which can certainly be construed as offering dishonour to a superior, 
is clearly there, and Fisher (119) sees this as the main reference of the hybris-words in this 
passage. Equally, however, both mega phronein and apeithein may convey some of the force 
of hybris here, and indeed the aspect of arrogant pride and wilfulness will be difficult to 
separate from that of disobedience, given that, in a domestic animal, the latter can always be 
construed in terms of the former and the former always furnish the explanation for the latter. 
This passage is compatible with Fisher's definition, although it also offers scope for an 
interpretation which lays more stress on the dispositional aspect. 
Elsewhere, however, and indeed in ge eral, the metaphor is better explained with reference 
to dispositional factors. Common to a number of metaphorical applications, for example, is a 
reference to food.'07 The analogy between the over-feeding which produces hybris in animals 
and plants and the wealth or good fortune which commonly leads to hybris in standard, human 
cases is well explained by Michelini, who also notes how the opposition between the hybris of 
plants and that of humans is mediated by the frequent association of the latter with both 
koros and vegetation imagery This notion of nurture and rowth is and growth in itself suggests those 
ideas of 'being full of oneself, 'becoming too great' which I have argued to be important, and 
surely implies a process in the hybristic organism itself, a process resulting in a condition of 
103 See MacDowell (n. 2) G&R 15-16, Meidias 21. 
104 Cf. R. Osborne in Cartledge et al. (n. 8) 85. 
105 See Fisher 19, 119-20. 
106 Fisher 121. 
107 See Arist. GA 725b35 (Fisher 19); Ar. Vesp. 1306, 1310 (Fisher 120); Theophr. HP 2.7.6, CP 2.16.8, 3.1.5, 
3.6.8, 3.15.4 (Michelini [n. 2] 36-8). Previous pampering rather than excessive nutrition per se is what leads to hybris 
in both horses and subjects at Xen. Hiero 10.2 (Fisher 119), but the common idea of sufficiency/surfeit still underlies 
the comparison. 
108 See Michelini (n. 2) 36 on Solonfr. 4. 8-10 (West) and Pi. 01. 1. 55-6, where the connexion between koros 
and food is explicit; cf Fisher 70-3, 240-2, on these passages, and 21, 75, 154-5, 212-13, 219, 221-3, 230-2, 233-5, 
272-3, 336, 347-8, 375-6 on others. Cf. also MacDowell G&R (n. 2) 15-16 and n.b. the association between nutrition, 
youth, and hybris at P1. Laws 835e (Fisher 486). For a recent (brisk) survey of koros in archaic poetry, see J.J. Helm, 
CWlxxxvii (1993) 5-11. 
109 See Solon fr. 4. 34-5 (West) (Michelini [n. 2] 40, Fisher 73), Bacch. 15. 57-63 (Michelini 39, Fisher 227-9); 
A. Pers. 821-2 (Michelini 40, Fisher 258-61), 104-11 (Michelini 39, Fisher 265); S. OT 873-9 (Fisher 329-38), fr. 
786 Radt (Fisher 97); cf the rapprochement between human and animal hybris at P1. Phd. 8 Ie (Fisher 456 n. 13) 
and Laws 808d (Fisher 480); also the physical and psychological forms of hybris at Laws 691c (see below). 
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satiety in which the potency or energy of the subject exceeds the norm; in a human being this 
will be the disposition of excessive self-assertion which arises from having had too much of a 
good thing and entails the feeling that one's own claims are superior to those of others."0 
This notion of excessive energy or power is present even in the passage from the Cyropaedia 
(above). The point of the reference to the hybris of horses (the megalophrosyne^ of bulls, etc.) 
is that it can be cured by castration (as it can in humans-the ultimate point is an analogy 
between castrated male animals and eunuch bodyguards). We do not have to look far to discover 
why it is that castration should be felt to cure hybris-there is clearly a link between the 
powerful forces of masculinity and a headstrong spirit which values self over others and rejects 
external restraint."' Even if the verb hybrizein refers to the commission of concrete acts in 
this passage, the association with an excess of natural energy and power constitutes an important 
part of the context which helps give hybris its meaning.'2 This association is, as MacDowell 
points out,"13 apparent in the attribution of hybris to donkeys: Fisher explains the 'erect 
hybris' of the donkeys about to be sacrificed by the Hyperboreans (P. Pyth. 10.34-6) with 
reference to 'the rampantly ithyphallic prancing that donkeys are often held to display in ritual 
and folk-tale contexts, and are often shown displaying in Greek art'.114 But where does this 
leave his definition of hybris? No doubt the donkeys' prancing coincides with their notorious 
recalcitrance, and no doubt this could be construed as a form of disobedience or dishonour; but 
there is no mention of such things in the context, and the application of the adjective orthios 
self-indulgent manifestation of their frivolous masculine energy."5 
In passages like these hybris is envisaged as a force which grows and wells up within the 
organism, a force which has its origins in the energy-giving properties of food or in the inherent 
fertility or fecundity of the subject itself, and which eventually grows so powerful that it can 
be contained no longer and 'breaks out'."6 This idea of hybris as a form of unchecked energy 
is present not only in its associations with plants and animals, not only in the use of plant and 
food imagery in the context of human hybris, but also in many of the standard contexts in 
which the concept is at home-in the common link between hybris and wealth;i"7 in those 
passages in which hybris is associated with tryphen;8 in the association of hybris with the 
110 Cf. Michelini (n. 2) 38-9: 'The b4ptpcov organism-whether human, animal, or vegetable-puts 
self-aggrandizement before the performance of the social role assigned to it'. 
II] For the hybris of the bull, that most masculine of animals, cf. E. Ba. 743-4; Fisher (121; cf. 450) sees the 
reference of hybristai here in 'frightening hostility to men', but I should prefer to see it in the creature's general 
'machismo', its brutish demeanour, and its exuberant sexual energy. 
112 This is another passage where Fisher's translation, 'committing hybris', assumes no distinction in sense 
between transitive and absolute uses. See above, nn. 48, 69. 
113 G&R (n.2) 15-16. 
114 Fisher 232-3 (quotation, 233). On the opposition between hybris and festive hesychia in this and other 
passages, see Fisher 216-42 passim and Dickie (n. 2); cf. W.J. Slater, ICS vi (1981) 205-14. 
115 For asinine hybris, cf. Hdt. iv 129 and Ar. Vesp. 1306, 1310; I doubt whether the point of comparison in 
these passages lies in 'acts of disobedience' or 'insolence to one's betters' (Fisher 120) rather than in the general 
skittish exuberance of a particularly self-willed creature. 
116 Such, I think, is the normal connotation of the compound exhybrizein; see below, n. 140. On the imagery 
of plant-like growth and efflorescence in the content of human psychology, see R. Padel, In and out of the mind 
(Princeton 1992) 134-7. 
117 See Fisher 19-21, 102-4, 113-17, and Index, s.vv. 'olbos', 'wealth'. 
118 See above Sect. III, Fisher 113-17. 
24 
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.197 on Mon, 16 Dec 2013 09:22:47 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HYBRIS, DISHONOUR, AND THINKING BIG 
young;'19 and in the connexion between hybris and alcohol in sympotic contexts,'20 where 
the significance of the concept is not exhausted by reference to the concrete acts of dishonour 
undoubtedly perpetrated by drunken hybristai, but also resides at least partly in the fact that 
alcohol unleashes energies which are normally repressed.'12 The notion of exuberance and 
excess energy is thus to be linked to the element of self-assertion, over-confidence, and 
presumption in hybris, in both metaphorical and non-metaphorical passages;122 it gives us a 
great deal of the flavour of hybris-not, indeed, the essence of the concept, but an important 
aspect of its phenomenology, and, I should say, of its 'meaning'. 
If this is correct, there are important consequences for the treatment of hybris in Plato. Fisher 
contends that Plato revalues hybris, greatly extends its range, and adapts it to his own, highly 
individual philosophy. 'Platonic' forms of hybris emerge in works of Plato's middle period, 
especially in the Phaedrus, and are atypical in that they represent hybris as any form of 
excessive desire (though the paradigm of such hybris is sexual desire) and oppose hybris to 
sophrosyne in what Fisher claims is a much more general sense than is normally the case.'23 
While I would not deny that Plato does very occasionally extend the application of hybris, I do 
not agree that he ever redefines the concept, and I believe that, if we give the dispositional 
aspect of hybris and its frequent representation in the language of exuberance and energy their 
due importance,124 then we can dispense with the distinction between 'Platonic' and 
'traditional' uses. 
Fisher's identification of a Platonic revaluation of hybris starts from a discussion of the 
relevant terms in the Phaedrus. In the first passage discussed in this connexion (237d-238c), it 
is indeed clear that some extension of the regular meaning has occurred, for hybris is explicitly 
applied to the rule in the soul of any form of irrational desire, opposed to s6phrosyne qua rule 
of reason over desire, and specifically said to include excessive desires for food, drink, and sex. 
The surprise in this passage is the extension of hybris to cover gluttony and dipsomania; but the 
surprise is softened, first (as Fisher himself points out, 468) by the regular association of hybris 
with food and drink-food and drink-food drink can be seen as leading to hybris, and one can eat and drink 
in a hybristic manner.125 But this association with food and drink does not normally extend 
to the identification of the specific desires for such things with hybris, and to that extent the use 
of hybris here is anomalous. The anomaly, however, is slight, and it is further reduced by the 
antithesis with sophrosynel (which is regular and traditional). Furthermore, as Fisher again makes 
clear (ibid.), the personificatory language of (here) bipartition facilitates an understanding of 
119 See esp. Arist., Rhet. 1389b8-9, 11-12, to be seen in the context of the spirited impulsiveness of youth 
(1389a2-bl2 passim); cf. PI. Laws 835e, where the hybris of youth is explicitly associated with being well fed; cf. 
n. 108 above, and Fisher 20, 97-9, and Index, s.v. 'youth'. 
120 See Fisher 16-17, 57-8, 98-102, 145, 203-7, 488; also Index, s.vv. 'symposia', 'drink'. 
N.b. esp. Panyassisfr. 13 Davies (Fisher 206). The links between drink, the control of passions, and the 
terminology of honour and shame are explored below re Plato's Laws. 
122 We should perhaps remember that the notion of 'flourishing' is typically opposed to hybris not only in the 
case of plants but also in connexion with both youth and the symposium (see [e.g.] B. MacLachlan, The age of grace 
[Princeton 1993] 39, 57-64, 91-3). 
123 See Fisher 467-79, 485-92, 499-500. 'Platonic' instances constitute a problem for Fisher's definition in that 
they often refer to forms of self-assertion in which no other person is harmed (453). Fisher (468-9) recognizes that 
these uses have developed from standard cases, for hybris is associated with the desires for food and drink, and is 
often found as a description of pederastic sexual activity (n. 34 above); hybris qua disobedience is also relevant, in 
so far as 'Platonic' hybris presupposes the tripartite or bipartite soul, in which the lower elements rebel against the 
higher. Nevertheless, he still sees the Platonic development as 'radical', and 'startling' (492). 
Fisher (e.g. 489, 491) recognizes the presence of many of the complex, traditional, and metaphorical 
associations in Plato's uses of hybris, but does not see these as mitigating the novelty of Plato's view of the concept. 
125 See (e.g.) Od. i 227 (Fisher 163, MacDowell G&R [n. 2] 16). 
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hybris as the refusal to fulfil one's allotted role, which can readily be construed as the 
dishonouring of superior by inferior. In so far as hybris is attributed to the quasi-personified 
desiderative part, then, its sense is quite regular and traditional; the departure from tradition 
comes only when this hybris of one part of the soul against another is said to account for hybris 
of the whole person. But this extension, as we have seen, is mitigated; and it is further mitigated 
by the fact that the main point of the passage is the condemnation of pederastic sexual desire, 
for in pederastic contexts hybris has come to be used as a descriptive term for practices which 
as a matter of fact involve the dishonour of a submissive by a dominant party.126 Also 
relevant, however, is the fact that hybris is not just the name for a type of act or intention to 
act, but can refer more generally to self-indulgent and egotistical self-assertion; such 
self-assertion, in the Greek context, is always a matter of honour, in that it inevitably involves 
an image of oneself and one's status which implies as a correlative a certain attitude towards 
the claims of others. In applying hybris to all forms of excessive desire (desires which involve 
excessive self-assertion both on the part of the whole person and on that of the desiderative part 
of the soul), Plato is exploiting the most fundamental of all significances of hybris, the idea that 
hybris involves a disposition in the agent which overvalues self and undervalues others. The 
hybris identified in this passage, then, is less startling under an interpretation which gives the 
dispositional aspect of hybris its due than it s  under one which stresses the actual over the 
dispositional. 
This is as far as Plato goes in extending the sense of hybris. The other passages in the 
Phaedrus are fully explicable in traditional terms; at 250e the opposition of psychic parts is not 
in question, and the hybris of the man who, on seeing the earthly manifestation of the Beautiful, 
conceives the desire the 'gesi the way of a four-footed animal and sow children' is opposed both 
to reverence (sebas) for the beautiful object and to aischyne at pursuing unnatural pleasure; it 
is thus fully at home in its normal context of honour and shame, of the disgrace of pederastic 
desires,127 and of the pursuit of self-asse rtion in the face of the honour of others. The next 
relevant passage comes in the description of the horses which draw the chariot of the soul, and 
so the opposition of psychic parts is relevant, but once again the personification of the parts 
makes the hybris of the bad horse analogous to that of a whole person; the good horse is a 
'lover of time with siphrosyne and aidos', the bad 'a companion of hybris and alazoneia' 
(253d-e). Both sides of this antithesis deal with attitudes to honour; the good horse values 
honour, but observes limit in its pursuit, its aidos recognizing the point at which excessive 
pursuit of time violates the honour of others and so becomes dishonourable for oneself, while 
the bad exaggerates its own importance (alazoneia) and pursues its selfish goals in excessive 
ways which dishonour others (hybris).2 Hybris here, to be sure, is used in the service of a 
highly individual Platonic doctrine, but its actual significance in the description of the 
personified psychic force is wholly traditional. 
Of course, the implication is there that the hybris of the 'bad horse', which represents the 
purely selfish, irrational, appetitive aspect of the human personality, will, if it prevails, translate 
into hybris of the lover against his paidika, and so there is a close link between these passages 
and the earlier at 237d-238c; but the application of hybris to all desires, while perhaps not 
totally abandoned, is at least not mentioned in these later passages, and so the hybris of the 
individual in whose soul the hybris of the appetites prevailed would be readily explicable as the 
126 Cf. Fisher 109-10 (and above, n. 34). 
127 See G. Vlastos, Platonic studies (Princeton 1973) 25 n. 76, and contrast A.W. Price, Love andfriendship 
in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1989) 228-9 n. 8. K.J. Dover, Greek homosexuality (London 1978) 163 n. 15, and 
Fisher 474 see a reference to both homosexual and heterosexual intercourse. 
128 For the opposition between the two horses in terms of hybris against aidoslaischyne, cf. 254c, 254e. 
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standard hybris of the pederast, abandoning proper self-control in favour of selfish desires which 
take no account of the honour of the other party. The real importance of the attribution of hybris 
to the bad horse lies in the recognition that this kind of self-assertion or self-indulgence springs 
from forces within the personality which subvert the individual's concern for the honourable; 
the personificatory allegory is Plato's way of locating hybris in a defective disposition of 
character, in which basic human drives have been allowed to run riot.129 His account thus 
combines stress on the dispositional aspect of hybris with the portrayal of this aspect in 
traditional terms as the product of the growth of powerful forces within the individual.'30 
The arbitrariness of Fisher's distinction between 'Platonic' and 'traditional' uses of hybris 
is demonstrated by his treatment of the discussion of the proper task of the statesman which 
concludes the Politicus (305e-311e). Fisher (479-80) is happy to classify the two instances of 
hybris-words in this section of the dialogue as 'traditional', denoting 'anti-social and unjust 
aggression', but this does scant justice to the argument. The discussion of the Statesman's task 
begins with the opposition of sophrosyne and andreia as traits of character; these two are then 
analysed into simpler terms, as quietness and quickness, which can be either praiseworthy or 
excessive; excessive quickness is called 'hybristic' and 'manic', excessive slowness or softness 
cowardly and indolent (307b-c). This temperamental opposition is then traced in the state, where 
the political consequences of the ascendancy either of the kosmioi or of those who tend towards 
andreia are equally disastrous, and so the role of the true Statesman must be to weave these 
elements into a harmonious whole, both in the individual and in the state; those who are 
incapable of sharing in a manly and sophron character, but instead are driven to atheism, hybris, 
and injustice by their evil nature, he must eliminate (308e-309a). 
In both applications of hybris-words here we are dealing with states of character in which 
an excess of vigour, 'quickness', or manliness leads to a breakdown in the personality; this 
aspect of the context is much more prominent than any implicit reference to aggression against 
others (though aggression is the consequence of the relevant character defect which makes it so 
problematic). The references to hybris must be understood in terms of the general opposition 
between self-control and self-assertion as dispositions of character; this is confirmed in the 
ensuing discussion of the twin methods of interweaving of andreia and sophrosyne, through 
education and eugenics, which emphasizes the importance of avoiding intermarriage within the 
two character-types-continuedinued intermarriage between brave and brave with no admixture of 
sophrosyne will issue in madness, while that between souls 'too full of aides and unmixed with 
manly daring' will eventually produce complete passivity (3 10d-e). Two points in this last 
129 In manifesting hybris and alazoneia, the bad horse, which represents the epithymetikon, is being credited 
with thymoeidic responses; but this phenomenon, in which each 'psychic part' possesses the capacities which typify 
the others, is a regular feature of Plato's tripartition, not a sign that the categories of the Rep. are breaking down. 
See J. Annas, An introduction to Plato's Republic (Oxford 1981) 142-6; G.R.F. Ferrari, Listening to the cicadas 
(Cambridge 1987) 185-203. 
130 Cases of 'Platonic' hybris in other works prove equally or more traditional. At Phd. 81e-82a (Fisher 476), 
hybreis are associated with vices (love of drinking, gluttony) which involve lack of self-control and contrasted with 
those (injustice, tyranny, rapacity) which entail action in infringement of others' rights. At Rep. 402e-403b (Fisher 
477) pederastic sex is said to involve excessive, maddening pleasures which signify hybris and akolasia and are 
incompatible with sophrosyne; the view that sophrosyne and excessive pleasure are incompatible because the latter 
'makes one go out of one's wits' shows that sophrosyne is being used in its everyday, quasi-intellectual sense. Hybris 
and akolasia, regular antonyms of sophrosyne, connote the pursuit of self-assertion beyond the limits which 
sophrosyne observes; akolasia is always liable to be reformulated in terms of hybris, because self-indulgence implies 
a view of one's time which takes little account of the time of others. It is partly this that makes such instances of 
hybris recognizably traditional; but also relevant are the elements of undisciplined, riotous exuberance (expressed 
several times by Plato in terms of mania) and the consequent failure to fulfil one's social role which are constitutive 
of the hybris of plants. For the opposition, hybris/akolasialmadness versus sophrosynellimit, cf. Phlb. 26b, 45d-e, 
Soph. 228d-229a (Fisher 478-9). 
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passage indicate that we are still dealing with matters pertinent to the earlier occurrences of 
hybris: first, madness is the ultimate consequence of an excess of manliness or daring, as at 
307b; we note, therefore, that manliness is said eventually to 'burst into bloom' (exanthein) with 
'madnesses of all sorts'; the botanical metaphor is familiar in the context of hybris, and it 
cannot be that hybris is not in Plato's mind here.l31 This suggests that we are to regard hybris 
and mania in 307b as close associates; both are, here as elsewhere in Plato (particularly in cases 
classified by Fisher as 'Platonic'), the result of an excess of vital, masculine energy, analogous 
to the excess of growth potential which produces hybris in plants. The reference to aidos is the 
second indication that we are still dealing with a form of hybris as an unbalanced, undisciplined, 
diseased state of character, for aidos is, even more clearly than sophrosyne, that recognition of 
the balance between one's own and others' time which inhibits excessive self-assertion. The 
discussion in which hybris-terms occur taus deals exclusively with the dispositions of 
self-assertion and self-control, expressed in terms which both invite a construction of these 
notions in terms of time and locate their origins in innate character-traits which must be 
regulated, educated, and harmonized. The Politicus thus effaces the distinction between 
'Platonic' and 'traditional' uses of hybris. It is 'Platonic' in seeing hybris as a character-trait 
antithetical to aidos and sophrosyne, but thereby also 'traditional', for hybris traditionally has 
its roots in a disposition of excessive self-assertion. 
The Politicus in many respects looks forward to the Laws, in which Plato's interest in the 
dispositional basis of hybris may also be traced. The roots of hybris in unrestrained drives are 
apparent in the long discussion of the utility of controlled alcohol abuse which dominates the 
early part of the work; symposia as they currently exist encourage pleasure, hybreis, and every 
sort of senselessness (637a-b), but in the controlled symposion advocated by the Athenian, 
through which one repeatedly comes to terms with one's own hybristic and other passions, 
repeated relaxation of one's aidos can eventually foster an ingrained form of aidos which keeps 
hybris safely under control. Hybris occurs only once in the discussion of the reformed 
symposion (649d5),132 but its one appearance has to be understood in the context of the 
discussion of methe as a whole. Basic to this is the opposition between sophrosyne and andreia 
which was operative in the Politicus but goes back ultimately to the Republic.133 In the 
discussion of alcohol as a drug which removes one's inhibitions and, paradoxically, facilitates 
the acquisition of an ingrained inhibitory mechanism, we are dealing with the same two 
educable drives as in the Politicus, one of self-assertion, described in terms of anaischyntia, 
anaideia, and boldness, and one of self-control, relying on the good phobos, aidos/aischyne.134 
It is with these self-assertive, bold, and dangerous drives that hybris belongs, as 649c-d makes 
clear: just as andreia has to be developed by confronting circumstances in which we naturally 
feel fear, so the avoidance of anaischyntia and boldness must be practised when we are affected 
by factors which naturally incline us to be exceedingly confident and bold, to wit thymos, eros, 
hybris, amathia, and philokerdeia,135 which arise from the conditions of being wealthy, 
physically attractive, or strong; all these things make us drunk with desire for pleasure and make 
us mad. It is clear from the list in which hybris occurs that the term is being applied in a 
131 L. Campbell, The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato (Oxford 1867) ad loc., is right to compare A. Pers. 821. 
132 See Fisher 488. 
133 See 646e-647a: andreia is a matter of dealing with fear of pain and danger in the correct way, and 
sophrosyne is closely associated with aidos/aischyne, which, qua fear of ill-repute, opposes the strongest pleasures. 
134 See 647a-d, 649b (the anaideia of the drunk), 649d, 671c-e; for wine as a drug which both relaxes and 
develops aidos, cf. 666a-c and 672b-d, with Cairns (n. 35) 374-5. 
135 Not deilia, rightly deleted by Ast (cf. E. B. England, The Laws of Plato i [Manchester 1921] 270). Amathia 
here is probably the effrontery involved in thinking one knows what one does not. 
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dispositional sense; the other terms are all dispositions or drives of agents, not forms of 
behaviour, and the purpose of the list is to name affections which naturally incline us to be 
confident and bold; it is thus impossible that hybris should refer to 'insulting violence and 
[unfortunate phrase] straight sexual excesses'.136 
So hybris is here a dysfunctional trait of character involving excessive boldness or 
confidence and a desire for some form of pleasure. The same characteristics recur in a 
specifically sexual context at 782e-783a.137 Where in the Phaedrus all excessive desires, 
including eros, were called hybris, here excessive desires for food and drink as well as for sex 
are called eros, and it is the last, the keenest form, which most sets people on fire with maniai 
burning with the greatest hybris; all three desires, however, are nosemata and their growth and 
onrush are to be quenched.'38 The 'growth and onrush' are those of the noseimata, not of 
hybris,'39 but still the fact that the eros which is regarded as a disease can 'burn with hybris' 
and produce madness reveals that we are dealing with that complex of ideas in which the 
deviant psychological drives which cause disturbances within human beings have much in 
common with the uncontrolled vital-forces which are described as hybris in plants.'40 We thus 
have the Phaedrus' identification of sexual and non-sexual desires as manifestations of one 
drive with different objects; this assimilation of other desires to the sexual urge combines with 
the presence of the metaphorical associations of hybris with exuberance, fertility, and turmoil 
in regularizing the application of hybris to all forms of desire (for hybris is regularly linked with 
eros in its everyday sense, and if all desires are forms of eros, then hybris can be associated 
with all desires). But this hybris is also a matter of excessive self-assertion at others' expense, 
logos. 14 
That Plato's view of hybristic desires is firmly rooted in the traditional significance of hybris 
is made clear by the discussion of three types of philia at 837a-d. The essential distinction is 
between the love of the body, a form of philia which is based on the lover's desire to obtain 
from the beloved something that he lacks, and a form which exists between equals and is 
reciprocated, the desire of one soul for another like itself. These forms can, however, be 
136 Fisher 488. 
137 Discussed by Fisher 485-6, and classified as 'Platonic'. 
138 England's explanation of the Mss. oe4vv6Ovrov as scribal error is persuasive, and it would be better to read 
op?vv6voat with the Aldine. 139 Hybris does, however, occur as the object of sbennumi at 835d-e, where hybris is a fire/disease/desire which 
burns and grows within the (well-fed) individual and leads to self-indulgent sexual behaviour. 
140 The notion of hybris as a form of disease or madness which results from too much of a good thing (n.b. 
tryphe at 691a) is active at 691c: giving 'more to the less' and disregarding moderation (e.g. sails to ships, food to 
bodies, and rule to souls) results sometimes in disease, sometimes in 'the offspring of hybris', injustice. The participle 
t3uppfovToc applies both to those things which break out into disease and those which produce injustice; we thus 
have a notion of physical disease as the result of a form of hybris in the organism which comes of over-feeding. The 
verb exhybrizein suggests in itself the bursting out of a hybris hitherto contained, and this fits very well with the 
statement that adikia is the offspring of hybris; hybris is thus the disposition, the force which grows out of control 
within the individual, and injustice is its issue in concrete acts. Fisher (19, 112, 120-1, 129-30, 135, 147, 299, 344, 
388, 393-4, 427, 489 [this passage]) typically refers the verb to the commission of acts. 
141 Cf. 835d-e (above n. 139) and 831c-e, where the elements of eros, shamelessness, and selfishness strongly 
suggest a hybris which lies in neglecting one's proper concerns as a human being in favour of a hedonistic 
conception of advantage. 
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combined within one individual, which inevitably causes a conflict of desires,142 between the 
motivation of one whose passion is a physical craving like hunger and who 'awards no time? to 
the character of the beloved's soul' and that of one 'who considers the desire for the body to 
be a matter of no importance', and who 'regards the fulfilment of the body with the body as 
hybris, and because he both respects and reveres sophrosyne, bravery, magnificence, and 
phronesis, would wish to remain pure forever with a pure beloved' (837b-d). 
The hybris which the pure lover rejects is traditional in two ways; first, it involves that lack 
of regard for the honour of the beloved that is attributed to the base, physical lover, and 
concentrates instead on selfish gratification of extravagant desires; and secondly, it constitutes 
a failure to live up to the standards of behaviour proper for one who aspires to virtue. This last 
makes contact with hybris in its traditional guise because Plato sees good performance of one's 
allotted role as a human being as a matter of paying honour where honour is most due-to 
reason, to the soul rather than the body, and ultimately to the gods. Indulgence of one's baser 
desires is hybris because it involves exalting oneself, and the inferior part of oneself, in the face 
of the much weightier claims to consideration of reason, the good, and the divine. Plato's ideas 
of what sorts of action or desire qualify as hybris may be idiosyncratic and extreme, but his 
view of what hybris is is entirely traditional; hybris is still a matter of illegitimately placing 
oneself, one's desires, and one's own claim to honour before the legitimate claims of others. 
One final passage may help to draw these ideas together. At 713c the Athe nian begins a 
myth which is used to illustrate the disasters which ensue when human beings order their lives 
and their communities without deference to an ultimate, divine authority. Human nature is 
insufficient to order human affairs without hybris and adikia (713c), and so Kronos placed 
human communities under the rule of daimones, whose kingship made for peace, aidos, 
eunomia and an abundance of justice, and justice, and mae human peoples free from faction and happy 
(713c-e). Contemporary communities must, as far as possible, recreate this kind of regime, in 
which the divine rather than the human is the ultimate source of authority, and foster obedience 
to the divine in us (713e-714a); the alternative, be it rule of one man, few men, or many, is 
irremediable disaster, caused by the insatiable urge to gratify extreme desires (714a).143 These 
remarks are presently followed by an appeal to the colonists of the new city, which extols 
humility before 'the god' and his attendant, Justice, and warns: 
if anyone, raised up by pride [megalauchia], whether exulting in money or honours, or again in bodily 
beauty along with youth and senselessness, blazes in his soul with hybris,'44 as if he needed neither ruler 
nor any leader at all, but were actually sufficient to lead others, he is left behind deserted by god, and, once 
left behind, he takes to himself yet others of the same kind and romps [GKtpTx], throwing everything at 
once into confusion; to a good many people he seems to be someone, but after a short time he pays to 
justice no negligible penalty, and utterly destroys himself, his household, and his city (715e-716b). 
142 This conflict is not presented as one between psychic parts, but as one between the two other types of lover, 
concrete persons representing abstract types of motivation. Thus we do not quite have the personification of the good 
and the bad horse of the Phaedrus myth, and the hybris which is associated with the inferior form of eros/philia is 
that of a type of individual rather than of one part of the soul against another. Cf. England (n. 135) ii 344, on 837a2, 
and 345 on 837b8. 
143 The paradosis would introduce the metaphor of disease at this point (714a5-6); but England's ([n. 135] i 442) 
defence of Hermann's seclusion of vof.uLatl is persuasive. 
144 It is unclear what text Fisher (489) is translating, but the Mss. 6 6t tI; txap0ets;...4XyEOat ...KaxraXett- 
Erat, printed by Burnet, will not do. We need either the et 6t ti; of some quotations or the 6 S6 tI; explained by 
England ([n. 135] i 448-9). N.b. that the conditions described in I xplra nv...cvotofc are those which are typically 
associated with hybris; if, therefore, England is right to take this phrase as subordinate to tapeots; bn6 
'EyaXWxXftax;, this is a sign of the closeness of hybris and megalauchia here. 
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Fisher calls this passage 'a mixture of old and new ideas', but there is no element which is not 
thoroughly traditional. The hybris of the unjust type is, as usual, something which results from 
too much of a good thing, a powerful force, associated with youth and high spirits, which builds 
up within the individual until it can be contained no more,'45 and which involves over-valuing 
one's own qualities to the extent that one under-values the claims of others and neglects one's 
social role. The novelty of the passage for Fisher seems to lie first in the stress placed on the 
role of the divine, and secondly in the notion of hybris in the soul; but although in both these 
directions Plato is using hybris as a n element in a moral theory that is certainly highly 
individual, his application of the term is in no way revisionary. Fisher is right to link this 
passage with others on the need to honour the soul, or the immortal in us,146 but while this 
does introduce the idea of the divided soul it implies no novel extension of the meaning of 
hybris, for hybris in such a context remains the insolent and self-centred failure to pay honour 
where honour is due. 
The exhortations to honour the soul and to refrain from hybris belong very closely with 
similar exhortations to honor the gods; in the immediate sequel to the passage quoted the 
hybristic way of life is contrasted with following the divine, behaving with sophrosyne, and 
honouring especially the gods and one's parents (716c-718a); this exhortation is then followed 
by a coda in which one's obligations to honour other relatives, philoi, and guests are also 
mentioned (718a). The emphasis on the need to honour the gods above all is typical of the 
Laws, but it entails no revaluation of the concept of hybris in the direction of a specifically 
religious offence; rather, since the gods are firmly entrenched at the top of a hierarchy of 
honour, hybris against them is the worst hybris of all.'47 Similarly, the hybris which involves 
a failure to honour the best part of oneself is a matter of withholding due deference; in 
dishonouring what should be an internal source of authority one is also giving in to a powerfully 
disruptive psychic force and failing to fulfil one's social role;148 these are traditional elements 
in the concept, and this way of looking at the matter is not a Platonic revaluation of hybris, but 
rather Plato's way of explaining what hybris, in its traditional guise, really is. The extreme 
over-valuation of the self that is hybris is, for Plato, a failure to control disruptive forces within 
the personality, a refusal to accept one's place within a rational system, and an exaltation of the 
merely human (or less than human) at the expense of the divine. Plato's recognition of the 
associations of hybris with exuberance, vigour, disease, and madness is, because it forms such 
an obvious point of contact between his view and some of the earliest poetic applications, 
valuable evidence of the dispositional basis of hybris. Since Plato does give the dispositional 
aspect its full significance and does connect hybris with failure to know one's place in society 
and in the universe as a whole, he is in some ways less revisionary in his approach to the 
concept than is Aristotle. 
145 Excess energy and high spirits, I think, are the basic connotations of aKitpT4 at 716b2; cf. Ar. Vesp. 1303-6. 
Fisher (491) would specify 'sexual excitement or over-confident violence'. 
146 Cf. 697c-d, 726a-728c (Fisher 490). 
147 Cf. the hierarchy of kinds of hybris at 884a-885b (Fisher 483-5). 
In Cairns (n. 35) 373-8 I underestimate the extent to which Plato's emphasis on 'honouring the soul' implies 
an internalized form of aidos; but see 378 n. 103 on 837c. 
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CONCLUSION 
We are now in a position to compare Fisher's definition of hybris with that of his most 
persuasive opponent; and it must be said that MacDowell's 'having energy or power and 
misusing it self-indulgently' can now be seen to have a great deal in its favour.'49 But its great 
demerit is its failure to recognize that, as social phenomena, the excess energy and self-indul- 
gence of someone who is 'full of himself' must be construed in terms of time. For time is the 
concept with reference to which are balanced the claims of the individual and the rights of 
others. Expressing one's excess energy self-indulgently means placing oneself and one's 
pleasure first, and thus losing sight of one's status as one among others. Self-aggrandisement 
constitutes an incursion into the sphere of others' honour, because the concept of honour is 
necessarily comparative.50 Thus the reason why MacDowell, Dickie, and others ought to 
recognize that their accounts of hybris should be firmly located within the concept of honour 
is also the reason why Fisher should accept that the essential relationship between hybris and 
dishonour can accommodate purely dispositional, apparently victimless forms of self-assertion. 
Both sides, in fact, make the same error, in working with a view of dishonour which is too 
narrowly focused on the perpetration of acts of physical or verbal affront; but both demonstrate 
valuable insights into the nature of hybris which should be incorporated into an account of 
hybris as a way of going wrong about the honour of self and others.'15 
DOUGLAS L. CAIRNS 
University of Leeds 
149 The element of self-indulgence is central to my view of hybris as excessive self-assertion in the face of 
others' claims; it also emerges in the frequent association of hybris with akolasia and in the antithesis of hybris and 
sophrosyne or aid6s; but it is especially prominent where acting 'just for hybris' is contrasted with action for some 
further motive (see n. 31 above). 
150 This is noticed by Aristotle in so far as he recognizes that hybris is a form of particular injustice which seeks 
to increase one's own honour at the expense of another (cf. n. 30 above); the comparative aspect of time also plays 
a major role in his account of phthonos at Rhet. 1387b25-30, 1388al2-24 (esp. 18-21). Aristotle's view has much 
(and mine a little) in common with the modern description of honour in terms of a 'zero-sum game'; but the very 
existence of the term hybris, referring to a way of dishonouring others which brings no honour to the agent, proves 
that the zero-sum view is an over-simplification. See Cairns (n. 35) 94 n. 141 (cf. 56 n. 42) and PLLS vii (1993) 162, 
166 n. 32; cf. (and contrast) now Cohen (n. 34) 63. 
151 This paper was written at the Seminar fur klassische Philologie (Gottingen) in the summer of 1993; I am 
grateful to the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung (and to Professor Dr C. J. Classen) for making my stay possible. 
I also wish to thank Dr Roger Brock, Dr Malcolm Heath, Professor Alan Sommerstein, and two anonymous referees 
for their helpful suggestions. I am especially grateful to Mr A.F. Garvie for stimulating discussion and criticism, and 
for generous cQmmunication of his own work on hybris, both published and unpublished. 
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